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1. Introduction  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) became a buzzword in business circles in the 1990s. 
High profile companies such as Shell, Nike, and Nestlé made public U-turns, reorganized 
their enterprise, and declared publicly their commitment to sustainable development. The UN, 
the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD all initiated programs to support and promote CSR, 
and business-NGO partnerships mushroomed. “The Big Four” consulting firms now all 
provide CSR services, and a plethora of standards, certification schemes and management 
tools are available to help companies improve their social and environmental practices 
through CSR initiatives.  
In the academic community, CSR research has traditionally been the domain of business and 
management disciplines, analyzing the management aspects of CSR in terms of how CSR 
influences, for instance, brand value, reputation, employee relations, investor relations or 
financial performance (Lockett, Moon, & Visser, 2006). More recently, however, CSR has 
caught the attention of social scientists seeking to understand the preconditions and 
implications of this newfound corporate interest in social and environmental responsibility. 
These authors are highly critical of how the business and management disciplines approach 
CSR, claiming that the analyses fail to account for the structural causes and political 
consequences of CSR.  
This dissertation aims to contribute to a more contextually informed analysis of CSR by 
studying how political-economic institutions influence CSR practices. Approaching CSR as a 
political phenomenon, the dissertation studies quantitatively whether political-economic 
institutions can explain variation in CSR practices across 20 advanced capitalist countries, as 
cross-national variation provides a key to understand the institutional foundations of CSR. 
However, the dissertation also seeks to provide a qualitative understanding of the mechanisms 
and processes by which political-economic institutions influence CSR. I therefore study in-
depth the CSR approach of state, market, and civil society actors in the Nordic countries, 
which I argue to be critical cases to our understanding of the political economy of CSR. To 
guide this qualitative and quantitative analysis, I develop an integrated analytical framework 
based on three complementary perspectives – comparative political economy, international 
political economy, and new-institutional theory. 
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The key concept of this dissertation – CSR – proves hard to define. Definitions tend to vary 
significantly across academic disciplines as well as among CSR practitioners from companies, 
civil society organizations and governments. Most definitions, however, emphasize that CSR 
is “beyond compliance,” referring to social and environmental activities or initiatives that 
companies undertake voluntarily. Furthermore, most actors define CSR as “beyond charity,” 
emphasizing that CSR aims to promote responsible practices in core business operations, in 
contrast to traditional corporate philanthropy. The widely quoted EU definition of CSR 
captures these two aspects, by defining CSR as: “A concept whereby companies integrate 
social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with 
their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Union, 2001, my emphasis). This 
definition signals first of all, that CSR departs from more paternalistic, philanthropic 
conceptions of corporate responsibility because it centers on responsible management of the 
day-to-day business operation itself. Second, the emphasis on voluntarism indicates that CSR 
is affiliated with policy models that advocate corporate self-regulation, in contrast to models 
advocating mandatory regulation to ensure responsible corporate practices. Thus, CSR is 
inherently connected to the larger debate on voluntary versus mandatory approaches to 
control corporate conduct, signalling that CSR is not just a business phenomenon, but also a 
political phenomenon. According to Sadler and Lloyd (2009), CSR assigns the roles and 
responsibilities of business in a way that has close affinity to the neo-liberal political model of 
of state–market–society relations. As Windsor (2006:112) claims, “It is difficult to entangle 
science, interest and ideology in CSR discourses.” Crane et al. (2008) therefore conclude that 
defining CSR is not just a technical exercise, but a normative and ideological exercise, as it 
inherently concerns how the political economy should be organized to restrain corporate 
power. As such, CSR relates to a number of questions and insights fundamental to the 
disciplines of political science, and benefits from analysis within the wider debate on the role 
of business in society – as an arena of political contestation and negotiation (Ungericht & 
Hirt, 2010). 
Despite the complex, political nature of CSR, the majority of CSR research devotes little 
attention to exploring CSR as a phenomenon. This analytical bias reflects the fact that CSR 
has mainly attracted scholarly interest from business and management disciplines. 
Consequently, the majority of CSR theory is derived from the premises of dominant theories 
within the business and management disciplines. For instance, authors within the marketing 
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discipline develop theories of how  CSR can improve a company’s public relations, brand 
value, and  reputation (Fombrun, 1996), while authors within the strategy discipline theorize 
on how CSR can improve a company’s competitive position (Porter & Kramer, 2006). As a 
function of the these disciplines’ utilitarian analytical interests, the majority of CSR theory 
focuses on managerial and instrumental aspects of CSR, aiming to identify how CSR can 
contribute to economic value creation (Lockett et al., 2006). These analyses treat CSR as the 
independent variable, investigating the consequences of CSR on the company’s bottom line.  
 
However, from a social science perspective, CSR inspires far more fundamental questions 
than those concerning its prospects for economic value creation: CSR implies a quite specific 
model for how to organize the relationship between state, market, and civil society, which is a 
fundamental political question in any society. In this respect, the dominance of business and 
management disciplines’ within CSR theory is problematic, as it provides researchers with an 
insufficient theoretical starting point to analyze CSR. This led Blowfield (2005) to describe 
CSR as “a failing discipline,” claiming that it is too preoccupied with prooving the business 
case and generating management tools, thus failing to question the discipline’s own premises 
and ignoring the larger issues of how CSR relates to global governance, power and economic 
globalization. He concludes that there is a striking lack of contextually informed analyses of 
the social, political and economic antecedents of CSR as well as of the wider governance 
implications of CSR. Put simply, the academic interest and theory development in CSR has 
centered on what CSR causes, not on what causes CSR.  
 
Recognizing that social sciences provide crucial insights and correctives to the largely 
business-dominated understanding of CSR, this thesis aims to contribute to a more 
contextually and structurally informed understanding of the political economy of CSR. As a 
consequence of the predominance of business and management disciplines, mainstream CSR 
analyses tend to focus on firm- or industry-specific factors. In contrast, this thesis focuses on 
factors at the systemic level by developing a framework to analyze the institutional 
antecedents of CSR, which will be outlined in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
This introductory chapter is organized as follows: The remainder of Section 1 outlines the 
thesis’s thematic delineation, its three specific research questions and its main theoretical 
perspectives and arguments. Section 2 reviews what I term “mainstream CSR literature,” and 
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on this basis, I argue the case for an institutional approach in the study of CSR. Section 3 
describes the main theories in the analytical framework, while Section 4 describes how I use 
these theories in practice in the integrated analytical framework. Section 5 describes the 
findings in the four articles that constitute this dissertation, while section 6 discusses their 
methodological challenges and limitations. Finally, Section 7 discusses how the articles 
contribute to the field of comparative CSR, before concluding with comments on the practical 
and theoretical relevance of the dissertation.  
1.1. Thematic delineation and research questions 
The rise of CSR in the global business community poses several fundamental questions 
regarding the role of business in society and regarding the limits and potential of voluntary 
approaches to corporate responsibility. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this debate by 
exploring the political-economic, institutional antecedents of CSR, aiming to answer the 
floowing, overarching question: To what extent, and how, do political-economic institutions 
influence CSR practices?  
 
To study the influence of political-economic institutions, the analysis centres on cross-
national variation in CSR practices. CSR inherently implies a main focus on corporate actors, 
but as this study aims to understand the political-economic, institutional preconditions of 
CSR, the analysis also includes governments, labor unions, employer’s associations and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) as part of the relevant set of actors. In a general sense 
therefore, I will study whether and how political-economic institutions influence the act of 
engaging in CSR to begin with, and whether they influence the types of CSR initiatives in 
which the actors choose to engage. For instance, companies can engage in CSR initiatives 
focusing on “softer” approaches like stakeholder dialogue, learning and exchange of ideas, in 
contrast to “harder” initiatives like trying to qualify for responsible investment indices or 
certification standards provided by independent third parties. Likewise, governments can 
choose to emphasize facilitating or partnering roles in their CSR promotion, or to adopt a 
stricter line aiming for agreements of a more binding nature. Furthermore, I will study two 
aspects of “CSR practices” more specifically. First, I  will analyze cross-national variation in 
CSR performance, that is, variation in the actors’ ability to succeed in their CSR efforts. 
Second, I will study specifically whether political-economic institutions influence the actors’ 
perceptions of CSR, especially the actors regulatory preferences concerning voluntary versus 
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mandatory approaches to corporate social and environmental responsibility. These two 
aspects of CSR practices, I argue, are key to understand the the more fundamental causes and 
consequences of CSR. 
 
To operationalize the research agenda outlined above, I organize the study around three 
specific research questions: 
1) Do CSR practices vary significantly across countries, and if so, to what extent do 
political-economic institutions explain this variation? 
2) To what extent is CSR predicated upon a neoliberal political-economic model of 
business-society relations, and which conflicts arise when CSR is introduced in social-
democratic societies? 
3) How does CSR relate to soft law and hard law, and under which conditions will the 
actors favor mandatory versus voluntary approaches to corporate responsibility? 
Cross-national variation provides a key to analyse the political economy of CSR, and 
Question 1) concerns the basic challenges of how to measure and explain patterns of cross-
national variation in CSR. These questions are mainly anwerred in Article 1 and 2. To answer 
whether there are significant, quantitative cross-national differences in CSR practices, Article 
1 develops a cross-national index of CSR practices. This index provides a measure of which 
countries are over-represented and under-represented in terms of the number of domestic 
companies represented in leading, global CSR initiatives. The index covers corporate 
participation from 20 nations in nine major, global CSR initiatives. Article 2 subsequently 
seeks to analyse whether cross-national variation in CSR practices can be explained by 
political-economic factors. Empirically, my analysis compares the countries’ scores on the 
CSR index, to well-established indicators from comparative political economy (CPE) and 
international political economy (IPE), using a comparative method called fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). The analysis is limited to advanced, capitalist 
countries both for reasons of comparability and for theoretical reasons, because theory 
development in comparative political economy mainly focuses on these countries. 
Questions 2) and 3) analyze more in depth the mechanisms and dynamics that link political-
economic institutions to CSR practices. Both questions concerns the nature of the political-
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economic model implied by CSR, and provides a basis for the discussion of the wider 
implications of CSR. Question 2) mainly approaches CSR from a nation-state perspective, 
looking at how CSR is adopted, conceptualised and implemented by state, market and civil 
society actors in social-democratic societies. Question 3) mainly approches CSR from a 
global governance perspective, looking at the role of political-economic institutions in 
explaining the actors’ regulatory preferences.  
The analysis of Questions 2) and 3), is limited to the Nordic countries, reputed to be leaders 
both in CSR and in social and environmental regulation (Birkin, Polesie, & Lewis, 2009; 
McCallin & Webb, 2004). I argue that the Nordic countries are “critical cases” to study the 
political economy of CSR, due to the strong institutional embedding of companies in these 
countries. In contrast to the Anglo-American neo-liberal, political-economic model, the 
Nordic political-economic model is characterised by social democratic welfare states, 
corporatist industrial relations, and collaborative business systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Schmitter, 1981; Whitley, 1999). Because of this strong institutional embedding of the Nordic 
economies, I argue that political negotiation and conflict surrounding CSR will be more 
pronounced than for instance, in neo-liberal countries. Consequently, the Nordic countries 
may reveal more of the political-economic mechanisms and dynamics related to CSR and 
thereby proved insights as to whether CSR is predicated upon a neo-liberal model that might 
conflict with a social-democratic model of state, market and civil society relations. Moreover, 
the majority of CSR theory is based on Anglo-American empirical studies, potentially leading 
to blind spots in terms of how the institutional environment affects CSR practices. A Nordic 
empirical contribution will therefore balance the Anglo-Americal bias in current CSR 
research and provide interesting contrasts in terms of how business, government and civil 
society have approached CSR.  
Empirically, the analysis of questions 2) and 3) mainly centers on business and government 
actors. However, corporatist and civil society actors are also included where relevant. The 
data material stems from two sources; The first source is a quantitative survey of Nordic 
pioneers in CSR that covers the 79 Nordic companies with the highest international CSR 
performance ratings. The survey asks questions both on how the companies practice CSR and 
on how they perceive CSR in relation to alternative modes of changing corporate practices. 
The second source is qualitative case studies of the Nordic governments. These case studies 
aims to provide an in-depth understanding of how Nordic governments have adopted CSR, 
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interpreted it, and subsequently formulated CSR policies. The case studies comprise over 70 
qualitative interviews, the majority being interviews with officials from Nordic government 
ministries and agencies, supplemented by interviews with Nordic trade unions, business 
associations, and NGOs,  as well as document analysis of key public policy documents.  
The answers to these three research questions have important implications for CSR as an 
approach to solving social and environmental challenges both nationally and in global 
governance, as will be discussed in the final section. 
1.2. Theoretical perspectives in comparative CSR 
Social sciences had devoted little interest to CSR as a research topic when I developed this 
project in 2005. Analyses emerged mainly in two theoretical traditions: First, scholars within 
new-institutional theory approached CSR. Their analyses tended to view CSR as a global 
mega-trend which, with the diffusion of economic globalization, spread from its Anglo-
American origin, throughout global business communities, in a way similar to that of other 
organizational trends such as New Public Management or Total Quality Management (Djelic 
& Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Second, international political economy 
(IPE) had taken an interest in CSR, mainly as an expression of the changing role of business 
in society that results from economic globalization. IPE authors often invoked the rapid 
economic globalization and its associated regulatory vacuum in their explanations of the rise 
of CSR. In particular, in explaining the newfound corporate interest in ethics, authors pointed 
to the strong public criticism of corporate power and unaccountability, increasing targeting of 
companies by NGOs and anti-globalization groups, as well as to challenges related to global 
production and value chains (Haufler, 2001; Mattli & Woods, 2009; Ruggie, 2003; Vogel, 
2009). 
While my general understanding of CSR is informed by IPE and new-institutional theory, the 
thesis aims to fill a gap in the existing literature. Both IPE and new-institutional theory tend to 
emphasize convergence in CSR practices; new-institutional theory predicts convergence 
based on their views on the dynamic of global organizational trends: Coercive isomorphism, 
mimetic processes, or normative pressures cause organizations to adopt similar practices in 
order to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007). IPE 
approaches also tend to expect convergence in CSR practices based on their view of CSR as 
response to the dictates of the global economy: In a globalised economy characterised by 
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severe governance gaps, corporations must adopt CSR in order to obtain the “social license to 
operate” necessary for their global value chains to function smoothly. Thus, IPE and new-
institutional theory lead us to expect convergence in CSR practices across nations, where 
business and governments increasingly adopt CSR as part of their corporate strategy or public 
policy. 
 
In contrast, my ambition is to explain the increasing evidence of divergence in CSR practices. 
Despite the homogenizing pressures mentioned above, there is ample evidence of cross-
national variation in CSR. Researchers demonstrate significant cross-national differences in 
how companies approach CSR communication, stakeholder prioritization, managerial 
processes related to CSR, corporate governance and corporate community contributions 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Brammer & Pavelin, 2005; Maignan & Ralston, 2002). The aim 
of this dissertation is therefore to complement IPE and new-institutional theory by 
contributing to more in-depth knowledge of cross-national variation in CSR. While new-
institutional theory and IPE will inform the analysis, the main analytical framework is based 
on comparative political economy (CPE). CPE has a long tradition of examining how political 
and economic institutions vary cross-nationally and affect corporate behavior, analyzing how 
political-economic institutions like the welfare state, labor unions, employers’ associations, 
central banks or education systems impact economic and political outcomes. The present 
project is mainly inspired by the firm-centered theories within CPE, such as the “Varieties of 
Capitalism”  approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and the “National Business Systems” approach 
(Matten & Moon, 2008 ; Whitley, 1999). This literature studies how political-economic 
institutions influence corporate strategy and performance in various areas, and can therefore 
give a valuable theoretical perspective on how political-economic institutions influence CSR 
practices, in particular among business actors.  
 
It is commonplace to claim that “institutions matter.” The crucial questions are of course, 
which institutions matter, and how do they matter (Ponutsson 1995). I argue that in the 
specific subfield of CSR, the institutions that matter are those institutions that contribute to a 
social embedding of the economy. As will be argued in section 4, the key institutions are a) 
the welfare state, in particular the strength of social and environmental government initiatives, 
b) the tripartite system, in particular the strength of labor unions and employer associations, 
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and c) NGOs and other civil society actors that influence public debate – not a political-
economic institution per se, but captured by the notion of political culture in CPE.  
 
In terms of how these institutions matter to CSR, I seek to identify the mechanisms and 
dynamics that link political-economic institutions to CSR practices. The key mechanism 
proposed is the idea of a comparative institutional advantage. I argue that strong institutional 
embedding of the economy constitute a comparative institutional advantage in CSR, which 
will affect the actors’ CSR practices, and specifically improve their ability to succeed in their 
CSR efforts. Inspired by new-institutional analysis, however, I also argue that a mechanism 
based on a “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 2004) is necessary to fully account for 
the formation of CSR practices. This logic of appropriateness is a necessary complement to 
the more consequentialist logic implied in the idea of comparative institutional advantages, 
and is particularly important to explain the actors’ perceptions of CSR. Furthermore, while 
CSR inherently implies a focus on corporate actors, political-economic theories argue for the 
inclusion of non-market actors/factors in analyses of corporate behavior. Thus, governments, 
and indirectly trade unions and NGOs, also form part of the empirical analysis. 
 
2. The CSR literature and beyond 
Most reviews of CSR literature conclude that CSR is not a unified academic discipline in 
terms of having a distinctive theoretical approach, assumptions or methods. Instead, CSR is 
classified as a “field of scholarship,” which relies on more established disciplines for its 
theory and methodology (Crane et al., 2008). Researchers have developed various typologies 
in attempts to categorize the CSR literature. For instance, Garriga and Mele (2004) distinguish 
between instrumental theories, political theories, integrative theories and ethical theories. 
Carroll (2008) concludes, in his review of CSR theory decade by decade, that theory 
development has given way to empirical contributions at the turn of the millennium, leading 
to a splintering of research interest and a diffusion of CSR into related academic fields. None 
of the proposed typologies has managed to establish itself as definite, and the CSR literature 
seems notoriously hard to capture in a single typology.  
The general lack of theoretical synthesis in CSR research is partly explained by the lack of a 
commonly accepted definition of CSR. Competing concepts, like “corporate citizenship,” 
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“corporate sustainability,” “corporate social performance,” “stakeholder management,” and 
“corporate accountability” are often used as alternatives but also as synonyms for “CSR.” De 
Bakker et al. conclude, from a bibliometric analysis covering 30 years of CSR scholarship, 
that theory development is hampered precisely by this continuous introduction of new 
concepts and linkages. Consequently CSR studies conceptualize, measure and operationalize 
CSR differently, making it hard to compare and evaluate findings across studies (Williams & 
Aguilera, 2008). 
Without trying to establish a competing typology, I will, for the purpose of the present 
project, categorize CSR studies in three broad categories – normative, instrumental and 
descriptive – in order to identify the scope for an institutionally based approach to 
complement the existing CSR literature. In the following, I will therefore present what I term 
“mainstream CSR literature,” namely the literature that has CSR as its specific object of 
study, before presenting an integrated framework for a more institutionally based approach 
mainly derived from CPE, and complemented by insights from IPE and new-institutional 
theory. 
 
2.1. Mainstream CSR literature 
 
Normative CSR theories 
The early scholarship on CSR is often normative, in that the analytical emphasis lies in 
developing moral arguments for why companies should assume social responsibilities. This 
normative orientation is evident in, for instance, Howard Bowen’s seminal book from 1953, 
The social responsibilities of the business man.” Normative arguments are also central to 
Freeman’s (1984) extensive work on stakeholder theory and are still prevalent in CSR 
writings that originate within the business ethics discipline. What unites these theories is a 
quest for the moral role of business in society, where authors construct arguments for how 
business ought to behave, often based on theories developed by moral  philosophers such as 
Kant, Locke or Rawls (Marens, 2004). The close affinity between CSR and normative theory 
is reflected in the fact that CSR is often referred to as the “CSR movement,” illustrating that 
the line between the academic and the idealist can be hard to discern (Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006).  
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However, several prominent authors within the CSR literature also raise normative arguments 
against CSR from utilitarian or neo-liberal perspectives. These authors see CSR as an undue 
distraction from profit-maximization, and as an unjustified intrusion in corporate affairs. In 
their opinion, CSR is counter-productive in that it will reduce the benefits of global capitalism 
by increasing companies’ transaction costs, limit competition, reduce efficiency and restrict 
freedom of choice (Drucker 2004; Henderson 2001). In a similar vein, Milton Friedman 
(1970) argues that CSR is problematic from a democratic perspective: It is the role of 
governments to design the rules of the game within which business should be free to pursue 
profit maximization, and that, as often quoted, “the business of business is business.”  
While valuable in their own right, normative CSR theories have a qualitatively different 
ambition than my project, and cannot serve as a theoretical foundation for an understanding of 
the institutional antecedents, nor for an understanding of the governance implications of CSR.  
Instrumental CSR theories 
The dominant, contemporary CSR theories can be classified as instrumental theories in the 
sense that the authors analyze how CSR can be used strategically to increase profits. These 
theories are mainly derived from well-established theories within business and management 
disciplines, where authors theorize on how CSR can become a means to improve employee 
relations, investor relations, resource efficiency, branding and reputation management, etc. 
Notable examples are Porter and Kramer’s argument for a link between competitive 
advantage and CSR (Porter & Kramer, 2006) and Elkington’s theory of a triple bottom line 
(Elkington, 1998). In certain instances, these instrumental analyses have a normative 
motivation, because there is a perceived need to defend CSR from skeptics who claim CSR 
distracts managers from profit maximisation, as the quote of management guru Peter Drucker 
illustrates: If you find an executive who wants to take on social responsibilities, fire him. Fast 
(The Economist, 2005). Thus, these instrumental theories aim to document the existence of a 
business case for CSR, which has tended to result in quite narrow, profit-oriented analyses. 
For instance, McWilliams and Siegel’s article (2001) illustrates this instrumental approach , 
concluding that “there is an ‘ideal’ level of CSR, which managers can determine via cost-
benefit analysis.”  
15
  
Again, this group of theories has a different purpose from understanding the institutional 
antecedents and wider governance implications of CSR, as their main theoretical ambition is 
to analyze the managerial aspects of CSR.  
Descriptive CSR studies 
Finally, while not really constituting a theoretical category of CSR studies, there are so many 
purely descriptive CSR studies that they warrant a category of their own. These studies focus 
on mapping corporate practices and they do so without much reference to theory. However, 
they provide data-rich case studies that could be useful for comparative purposes. Several 
large-scale and ambitious cross-national comparative studies from international groups of 
researchers areparticularly interesting to my project, for instance, Habish et al.’s extensive 
mapping of CSR practices in Europe (Habisch, Jonker, & Wegner, 2005) and Visser et al.’s 
mapping of CSR in 58 countries in the World Handbook of CSR. Unfortunately, the utility of 
these studies for comparative purposes is limited, as it is hard to evaluate and compare across 
studies because of the general lack of consensus regarding concepts and operationalization 
(Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Williams & Aguilera, 2008). This lack of a sound 
conceptualization and analytical framework in descriptive CSR studies led Van Oosterhout 
(2010) to claim that CSR researchers merely have collected a “pool of data in search of a 
theory.”  
2.2. The scope for an institutionalist approach to CSR 
Recent reviews of CSR scholarship envision a rather pessimistic future for CSR theory, 
because the authors identify fundamental theoretical and conceptual weaknesses in the current 
literature. In reviewing three key CSR approaches, Windsor (2006:11) describes CSR analysis 
as “embryonic and contestable,” and claims there is little prospect of theoretical synthesis, 
because the authors tend to draw on multiple, partly overlapping, and partly conflicting 
research streams from different disciplines and traditions. Combined with the continuous 
introduction of new concepts and definitions of CSR (de Bakker, Groenewegen, & den Hond, 
2005), theory development is severely hampered. Lockett et al. (2006) reach much the same 
conclusion, describing CSR research as a “field without a paradigm” in a “continuous state of 
emergence.” However, critics point to not only the lack of theoretical synthesis. They also 
describe the analyses themselves as lacking in several aspects: Utting and Marques (2009:3) 
declare an “intellectual crisis of CSR,” judging CSR analyses as “largely ahistorical, 
empirically weak, theoretically thin and politically naïve.” In particular, they point to the lack 
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of critical analysis of the effectiveness of CSR’s voluntary form of embedding the economy, 
as opposed to traditional forms for embedding the economy, such as strong states, social pacts 
and civil society. To rectify this, Utting and Marques claim that CSR scholars need to 
acknowledge the importance of institutional factors and power relations, and to account for 
their relative influence under different “varieties of capitalism” (ibid:7). Drawing an even 
bleaker picture, van Oosterhout and Heugens (2008:198) conclude that CSR theory is “Much 
ado about nothing” and advise that “it would be prudent for the field to dispense with the 
notion of CSR altogether,” claiming that other theories from, for instance, economics and 
sociology are better able to explain the types of phenomena CSR researchers study.  
 
The criticism leveled at mainstream CSR theory appears quite fitting in relation to my project. 
The majority of existing CSR literature does not, from a political-economy perspective, 
provide a theoretical foundation for analyzing either the causes or the consequences of cross-
national variations of CSR: The analytical purposes of normative and instrumental theories 
are not directed towards understanding CSR as a political phenomenon. Descriptive studies 
are potentially useful for their empirical contributions, but at the same time, their value is 
severely diminished because CSR is defined and conceptualized differently across these 
studies.  
This project therefore aims to follow van Oosterhout and Heugens’ advice (2008) by applying 
theories from political science to the analysis of CSR. In trying to achieve a more structurally 
and contextually informed approach to CSR, I base my analytical framework on three distinct, 
but interrelated, theoretical traditions that are specifically developed to understand political-
economic and institutional phenomena: International political economy, new-institutional 
theory and comparative political economy. In the next section, I will detail how insights from 
these three theories can form an integrated analytical approach to CSR.  
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1. International political economy (IPE) – the logic of CSR 
International political economy informs my basic understanding of how and why companies 
and governments increasingly engaged in CSR as an approach to improve corporate social 
and environmental practices in the 1990s. IPE authors claim that the rise of CSR has less to 
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do with a newfound corporate interest in ethics, and more to do with fundamental changes in 
the global political-economic system.  
IPE authors are concerned with explaining the shifting power dynamics between business, 
government and society. In particular, neo-pluralist and structuralist authors within IPE 
argued for “bringing the firm back in” to the analysis of international politics (Eden 1991), 
and for assigning a privileged role to business in understanding the formation of international 
politics (Cox 1996). Lately, this literature has increasingly given attention to political 
processes that take place outside the traditional, state-centered international politics, namely 
private-actor governance whereby business or civil society actors develop voluntary 
initiatives to regulate corporate social and environmental behavior. In their view, CSR is part 
of this larger trend towards private regulation, and needs to be analyzed critically in the 
context of a fundamental shift in political power between state, market, and civil society 
actors (Clapp & Utting, 2008; Fuchs, 2007; Hirschland, 2006; Jeremy Moon & Vogel, 2008). 
The emergence of CSR is, in IPE writings, closely coupled with the processes of economic 
globalization and liberalization, and the governance gap resulting from these processes 
(Doremus et al., 1998; Pauly, 1999; Stopford & Strange, 1991). Historically oriented accounts 
usually begin with the post-war era, when the Bretton Woods system instituted what Ruggie 
termed “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1998) by securing a balance between increased 
liberalization and free trade on the one hand, and the power of states to intervene and govern 
their national economies on the other hand. This balance came under pressure towards the end 
of the 1960s resulting in the dissolution of the fixed exchange rate system and a deregulation 
of the restrictions on capital mobility (Story, 1999; Strange, 1998, 2000). This opened for a 
dramatic increase in the transnationalization of companies, through foreign direct investments 
and short-term capital flows. The political implication was a reduction in governments’ ability 
to control and regulate companies, and in particular the transnational companies (TNCs), 
because companies and investors now freely and quickly could relocate their investments 
(Stopford & Strange, 1991). In addition, governments’ willingness to control corporations 
diminished due to a neo-liberal turn in the ideological landscape. Thus, IPE scholars often 
explain the “rolling in of CSR” by the corresponding “rolling back the state” characteristic of 
the Thatcher-Reagan era (Sadler & Lloyd, 2009). 
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The public anti-globalization upheavals of the mid- to late 1990s are of particular importance 
to IPE analyses of CSR. These demonstrations were not aimed primarily at governments, but 
directly at business. Transnational companies in particular were a favorite target for NGO 
campaigns, for organized groups such as “Attac,” and for less organized public upheavals like 
“The Battle of Seattle.” Demonstrators voiced strong anti-corporate sentiments in Seattle, 
Genoa, Gothenburg and other cities during the summits of World Economic Forum, EU, 
WTO, and other organizations associated with promoting economic liberalization. Public 
resentment was further fuelled by corporate scandals such as Shell’s perceived complicity in 
the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and other political activists in Nigeria, MacDonald’s 
destroying rain forests for cattle production, and sweatshop conditions in Nike production 
plants to name a few. These loud demands for a more socially and environmentally 
responsible globalization posed a new set of challenges to business leaders, and signaled 
radically new expectations regarding the role of business in society. Companies operating in a 
global environment could not ignore these expectations unpunished. 
In a globalised economy, then, a responsible profile is more than a nicety – it has a real effect 
on brand value, stock value, public relations, employee relations, investor relations, etc. While 
companies previously obtained sufficient legitimacy by following national rules and 
regulations, today they must go beyond legal requirements in order to be perceived as 
responsible and legitimate actors. As Newell (2000:38) frames it: “Social norms increasingly 
outstrip legal requirements on firms.” In this regulatory vacuum, with limited state control 
over global corporate practices, the corporations themselves must take steps to gain trust and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public through voluntary CSR initiatives. IPE authors therefore 
portray CSR initiatives are a functional response to the external pressures caused by economic 
globalization. CSR becomes intrinsically linked to competitiveness because corporations 
need, for commercial reasons, to establish a new form of legitimacy and “social license to 
operate” in the global economy (Dicken, 2003; Sklair, 2001). Consequently, economic self 
interest is at the core of the CSR logic, where the main force motivating companies to engage 
in CSR is the business case for CSR, as detailed by instrumental theories of CSR (section 
2.1). 
However, IPE scholars point to the fact that this business case applies only to a quite narrow 
subset of companies, mainly those operating in high-risk markets, or to industries and 
companies dependent on brand image, sometimes also extending to these companies’ key 
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suppliers further down their global value chain (Vogel, 2005). Thus, susceptibility to pressure 
is not evenly distributed among companies, and consequently, CSR does not promise a 
business case for all kinds of companies. IPE scholars, therefore, argue that we must 
acknowledge the business community’s “political case for CSR” to fully account for the 
popularity of CSR. As Levy and Kaplan (2008) argue, the weakness of the business case for 
CSR suggests that one should not underestimate the political motivations for companies to 
engage in CSR. Many IPE scholars tend to be skeptical regarding CSR’s effect on global 
social and environmental governance, and subscribe to a zero-sum model where CSR 
supplants rather than supplements hard law in international politics. Sadler and Lloyd (2009), 
for instance, claim that CSR is part of a wider neo-liberal agenda that tries to re-cast the 
boundaries between corporate-centered voluntarism and state-centered regulation. In an IPE 
perspective, CSR emerges as a political project whereby business tries to influence public 
perceptions and public policy in favor of voluntary, corporate self-regulation as opposed to 
mandatory regulation. Consequently, CSR cannot be understood in isolation from the wider 
debate on power and global governance (Blowfield, 2005; Fuchs, 2007; Moon & Vogel, 
2008; Newell, 2000). This has important implications for our understanding of the limits and 
potential of CSR, as discussed in section 7.3.  
To conclude, IPE scholars portrays CSR and other forms of private social and environmental 
governance as a functional response to the new challenges presented by economic 
globalization and the global governance gap. Furthermore, the IPE perspective highlights the 
political dimension, seeing CSR as a corporate political project with important governance 
implications, in terms of the effect CSR has on attempts to regulate corporate social and 
environmental behavior. Thus, this strand of research provides crucial insights into the 
structural conditions that frame CSR and thereby highlights both the causes and the potential 
consequences of CSR (Fuchs, 2007; Haufler, 2001; Mattli & Woods, 2009; Utting, 2000; 
Vogel, 2005). 
Looking more specifically at the three research questions outlined in Section 1.1, one can 
derive certain hypothetical answers from the IPE theory. Regarding research question 1), IPE 
does not expect significant cross-national variation due to political-economic institutions. 
Instead, IPE expects any cross-national variation in CSR to mirror exposure to economic 
globalization. Consequently, countries with strongly globalised economies are expected to 
have a high proportion of companies with strong CSR performance. In terms of question 2), 
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IPE certainly sees CSR as part of a neo-liberal agenda, but expects the dictates of global 
markets to overrule conflicts over CSR in social-democratic societies, leading to convergence 
in CSR practices. Finally, regarding the question of regulatory preferences in question 3), IPE 
sees CSR as affiliated with a business-led, neo-liberal and voluntaristic agenda, and expects 
corporate actors to favor CSR and self-regulation over soft law and hard law.  
However, IPE does not directly address the topic of the thesis, namely how political-economic 
institutions affect CSR cross-nationally. The emphasis in IPE remains state-centered, and 
scholars focus mainly on explaining how business influences state bargaining and negotiating 
positions in international regimes. More critically, IPE scholars are accused of neglecting the 
importance of domestic institutions in international relations (Farrell and Newman 2010), and 
several authors argue that IPE theory would benefit from the inclusion of  institutionalist 
perspectives from comparative political econmoy (CPE) (Chang, 2002; Kraphol, 2008). 
Consequently, IPE does not provide a complete theoretical starting point for explaining the 
observed cross-national differences in CSR nor for analyzing how political-economic 
institutions influence corporate social and  environmental behavior more generally. For this, 
we must look to comparative political economy, with its traditions of systematically 
examining how political and economic institutions vary cross-nationally and affect corporate 
behavior.  
3.2. Comparative political economy (CPE) 
Comparative political economy comprises a wide variety of theories, and traces its roots to 
several of the nestors of the social sciences, such as Adam Smith, Karl Polanyi and Max 
Weber. The older works focus on the merits of different political-economic models, most 
notably the debate over capitalism versus socialism. More recent classics include Douglas 
North’s theory of the firm, and the works of John Maynard Keynes, which profoundly 
influenced post-war public policy. What unites political economists is the assumption that 
institutions are fundamental to the functioning of the economy, as captured by Polanyi:  
The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic. 
The inclusion of the non-economic is vital. For religion and government may be as important for the 
structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions (…) (Polanyi 1968:127) 
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While the “grand debates” in political economy are outside the scope of this project, their 
institutional approach to economic behavior has inspired key recent literature in comparative 
political economy.  
A common contention of CPE theories is the claim that political-economic institutions divide 
capitalist countries into fundamentally different country clusters. Older works, like those of 
Weber and Gramsci, portrayed one variety of capitalism as replacing other forms over time. 
One can also retrieve this line of reasoning in the more simplistic, hyper-globalist view of 
globalization as a homogenizing force that transforms all economies into more or less 
successful neo-liberal economies, as presented by for instance Fukuyama (1992) and Ohmae 
(1996) . Contrary to this unidirectional view of capitalist development, modern CPE refuses 
the idea of a necessary evolutionary development where one political-economic system 
outperforms and supersedes all others. Instead, different systems are seen as a response to 
different sets of social, political and economic challenges. Consequently, political-economic 
institutions reflect unique political and economic logics that are unlikely to converge around a 
single model in the future. Because of institutional complementarities and vested interests, 
CPE authors claim that political-economic institutions to some extent are self-reinforcing and 
of a relatively perpetual nature since they also shape how the actors respond to new challenges 
(Esping-Andersen, 1996:6). 
Recent CPE classics study how different political-economic systems have developed their 
unique types of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990), political cultures and constitutional 
systems (Arend Lijphart, 1999; Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991), industrial relations (Schmitter, 
1981) and international orientation (Katzenstein, 1985). However, Hall and Soskice (2001) 
point to a lack of research on the role of the firm and on how political-economic institutions 
influence corporate behavior. Their aim is to analyze state, market and civil society relations 
from a firm-centered perspective, which has inspired authors to analyse how political-
economic institutions affect corporate behavior (Amable, 2006; Crouch, 2005; Peter A. Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999). These analyses of how the institutional environment 
conditions the strategic behavior of firms are arguably highly relevant for my ambitions to 
explore whether and how political-economic institutions explain cross-national variation in 
CSR practices.  
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Consequently, my main analytical approach is informed by the firm-centered analyses from 
the “varieties of capitalism” literature within CPE, in particular, the concept of “comparative 
institutional advantage,” as introduced by Hall and Soskice (2001). While the classic 
Ricardian concept of comparative advantage limits the analysis to a country’s relative access 
to land, labor, and capital, Hall and Soskice claim we need to extend this reasoning to also 
include institutions as a source of comparative advantage. Different political-economic 
institutions can explain not just why production of some kinds of goods or services is 
clustered in some countries, but also why this exact product or service is produced in that 
country and not another country. Hall and Soskice claim that a country’s political-economic 
system, and its corresponding institutional environment, offers the firm a particular set of 
opportunities and barriers which will influence firm strategy. Since these institutions are 
collective, often nationally framed and partly outside the influence of each individual firm, 
Hall and Soskice maintain that they will shape corporate strategies in a given nation. Based on 
a rational-choice perspective, firms will gravitate towards strategies that take advantage of the 
opportunities provided by the political-economic institutions: 
In short, there are important respects in which strategy follows structure. For this reason, our approach 
predicts systematic differences in corporate strategy across nations and differences that parallel the 
overarching institutional structures of the political economy (Hall and Soskice 2001: 15.)  
 
While Hall and Soskice analyze how different political-economic institutions shape nations' 
innovation profiles, I argue that their reasoning can successfully be applied to my analysis of 
how these institutions affect CSR. In particular, their concept of “comparative institutional 
advantage” is highly relevant to my project, because it captures the mechanism that links 
political-economic institutions to corporate strategy and behavior. Furthermore, their theory is 
influenced by rational choice approaches within institutional theory, and is likely better 
positioned to capture corporate behavior than are the sociological or historical strands of CPE. 
Thus, this logic of a comparative institutional advantage informs my general argument for 
how institutions for strong embedding of the economy influence CSR practices, and in 
particular informs my explanations for cross-national differences in CSR performance. In this 
respect, Hall and Soskice distinguish between two broad types of political-economic 
institutional systems: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies 
(CMEs). The debate on the LME/CME distinction has raged since the authors launched it in 
2001, and I concur with the critics who claim that this dichotomy is too coarse to capture 
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important cross-national diversity (Hancké, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007). Instead, I use 
measures and typologies of a more detailed kind, as will be discussed in Sections 6. 
This question of CSR’s institutional antecedents has increasingly caught the attention of CSR 
scholars within the social sciences. However, authors disagree on the causal relationship 
between political economy and CSR practices. In their widely quoted article, Matten and 
Moon (2008) argue that CSR practices are more prevalent in liberal market economies 
(LMEs) than in coordinated market economies (CMEs). They explain this prevalence by 
referring to LMEs as having a weaker institutional embedding of the economy, thus 
increasing the need for companies to take on responsibility voluntarily and to explicitly 
communicate this through CSR initiatives. In contrast, corporate responsibility in CMEs is 
secured by state and corporatist institutions, and therefore remains “implicit,” reducing the 
scope and need for companies to partake in CSR initiatives. Kinderman (2011) and Jackson 
and Apostolakou (2010) build on this research, arguing that CSR in liberal market economies 
functions as an institutional substitute for these economies’ weaker welfare-state and 
corporatist systems. Consequently, these authors expect a strong embedding of the economy 
to lead to weaker CSR. However, there are equally plausible arguments for the opposite 
scenario: Campbell (2007) argues that responsible corporate behavior is partly determined by 
the institutions within which the companies operate. He argues that institutions provide 
companies with sticks and carrots that constrain and enable certain types of corporate 
behavior – an argument that corresponds closely to Hall and Soskice’s (2001) argument on 
comparative institutional advantage. In describing what makes corporations behave socially 
responsibly, Campbell (2007) points to the importance of public and private regulation, the 
strength of monitoring organizations such as NGOs, activists and media, and to the 
institutionalized dialogue with stakeholders such as unions, community groups, investors and 
other stakeholders. Thus, Campbell claims that strong institutional embedding of the economy 
will foster more responsible behavior among companies.  
Thus, authors within comparative CSR disagree on the effect of strong institutions for social 
embedding of the economy. This debate had not reached international journals at the time I 
developed my project. In hindsight, my analytical approach most closely resembles 
Campbell’s, in that I expect a strong institutional embedding of the economy to lead to 
stronger CSR performance. Inspired by the Hall and Soskice’s (2001) argument of 
comparative institutional advantages, I expect companies from strongly embedded economies 
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to have higher standards and more experience in social and environmental issues when CSR 
hits the agenda, merely as a function of their having adapted to an institutional environment 
with bigger sticks and bigger carrots. Thus, this argument is the basis of my analytical 
framework detailed in Section 4. The alternative scenario – strong embedding leading to weak 
CSR – will be reviewed in depth in Section 7.1 where I discuss my contribution to this 
specific debate.  
In relation to the three specific research questions outlined in section 1.1, I can now derive 
some hypothetical answers from CPE theory: Regarding research question 1), CPE theory 
predicts significant cross-national variation in CSR practices, and expects these differences to 
mirror the nations’ political-economic institutions. Consequently, countries with strong 
institutions for embedding the economy are expected to have strong CSR performance in their 
domestic companies. Regarding research question 2, CPE sees CSR as having a close affinity 
to the neo-liberal model. Because of the actors’ having developed their strategies in a way that 
takes advantage of the opportunities provided by the institutional structure, CPE predicts 
conflicts and resistance to CSR in social-democratic societies and expects continued 
divergence in CSR practices. Finally, in relation to question 3), CPE expects regulatory 
preferences to mirror political-economic traditions, because of vested interests and 
comparative institutional advantages developed in relation to these political-economic 
institutions. 
However, the institutions themselves tend to remain something of a black box within both the 
IPE and the CPE approaches. Understanding the internal institutional dynamics is important 
to identify the mechanisms that link political-economic institutions to CSR practices, as 
specified in research question 1) in section 1.1. In the case studies of Nordic governments and 
businesses’ approaches to CSR, I will therefore lean more on new-institutional theory to 
explore the internal institutional dynamics and mechanisms that link political-economic 
institutions to the actors’ CSR practices, and in particular to explore their perception of CSR. 
Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) argue for such a combination of CPE and new-institutional 
theory. In their view, CPE approaches institutions from a structural-regulative perspective, 
whereas new-institutionalism approaches institutions from a normative-cognitive perspective, 
and both approaches are necessary to understand cross-national convergence and divergence 
in organizational practices. 
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3.3. New-institutional theory 
New-institutional theory offers more of a cultural and socialization perspective on CSR by 
focusing on how organizations adapt to expectations in their environments. This perspective is 
well suited both to capture how CSR spreads globally as a “mega-trend” among state, market, 
and civil society actors, and to study the internal institutional processes that take place when 
CSR is adopted and implemented by these actors.  
Theorizing on the institutional aspects of organizational practices takes many shapes; Peters 
(1999) identifies nine institutional approaches within political science alone. The following 
presentation is mainly inspired by normative and historical new-institutionalism, as these 
strands of new-institutionalism emphasize the role of norms and values in defining institutions 
and in influencing behavior (ibid). More specifically, normative new-institutionalism 
emphasizes the importance of legitimacy in understanding institutional behavior, and 
therefore offers a relevant perspective on how and why CSR diffuses globally, an on the 
processes that take place internally when organizations adopt and implement CSR. Historical 
new-institutionalism emphasizes the importance of the historical roots of the institution, 
focusing on how institutional behavior is path-dependent. By focusing more on the internal 
institutional dynamics, this approach complements CPE’s approach to the influence of 
political-economic institutions in shaping organizations’ behavior. 
Beginning with the issue of the global diffusion of CSR, new-institutional theory emphasizes 
that organizations cannot comply only with expectations regarding the efficient production of 
their goods or services. As Brunsson and Olsen argue: “Organizations are also evaluated on 
the basis of whether they use structures, processes and ideologies that correspond to that 
which important actors in their environment consider rational, efficient, reasonable, just, 
natural and modern (1990:10, my translation from Swedish).” Thus, organizations must also 
comply with expectations from their institutional environments related to how their products 
or services are produced, by adopting the expected organizational structures and management 
practices (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). New-institutionalism thereby portray decision-making as 
not based only on a “logic of consequences” whereby actors behave according to cost-benefit 
calculations; decision-making in institutions is also based on a “logic of appropriateness” 
whereby actors behave according to what is considered legitimate in the institutional 
environment (March & Olsen, 2004). In terms of CSR, having the relevant social and 
environmental certificates, a CSR report, and an ethical code of conduct, and being a member 
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of different CSR initiatives have become necessary components for companies wanting to be 
perceived as legitimate and modern, and have become prerequisites for being considered as an 
attractive employer, brand, or business partner (Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Thus, the global 
diffusion of CSR parallels that of other organizational “mega-trends” like New Public 
Management and Total Quality Management, which popularity can be explained partly by the 
legitimacy that they confer upon the organization, rather than by their ability to improve the 
organization’s capacity to produce its goods or services. 
DiMaggio and Powell identify three ways in which organizational concepts spread (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Matten & Moon, 2008 ; 1991). First, they spread through coercive 
isomorphism, whereby organizations adopt a new organizational concept or trend because of 
direct pressure from other organizations. For instance, a company can adopt CSR because of 
demands from customers, business partners in their supply chain, governments, or watchdog 
NGOs. Second, organizational concepts can spread through mimetic isomorphism, whereby 
uncertainty leads actors to look to other organizations and to copy their structures and 
processes. For instance, the new and sometimes unpredictable expectations concerning a 
company’s social and environmental responsibilities can lead the company to emulate the 
CSR practices of the bigger, successful companies, or to sign on to high-profile initiatives like 
the UN Global Compact to gain legitimacy. Finally, normative pressure through increasing 
professionalization can also cause convergence in organizational practices, whereby the 
educational system and professional associations develop common thought patterns and ways 
of thinking and talking about the appropriate way of organizing or managing an organization. 
As CSR increasingly becomes part of the agenda in business schools, industry associations, 
governments, and civil society organizations, CSR will spread as a normative blueprint for 
how a modern company should be managed. Meyer (1999) also points to the role of 
“consultants” – scientists, think tanks, and educators – in forming a global discourse whereby 
ideas and concepts are diffused globally. Such an “epistemic CSR community” is gradually 
consolidating as major international organizations like the UN, the OECD, the World Bank 
and the EU introduce CSR initiatives, and organizations like the ISO and the Global 
Reporting Initiative establish global guidelines and standards for CSR practices. 
Crane et al. (2008:3) describe CSR’s phenomenal rise to prominence in the 1990s and since as 
“a journey that is almost unique in the pantheon of ideas in the management literature.” Thus, 
in combination with the structural conditions related to globalization emphasized by IPE 
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(section 3.1), the new-institutional theories of coercive, mimetic, and normative processes of 
isomorphism provide a complementary explanation for the rapid global diffusion of CSR. 
However, a fast global diffusion of an organizational concept does not imply implementation 
without conflicts. Despite originally being an Anglo-American management idea (Matten & 
Moon, 2008), CSR has now spread far beyond Anglo-American societies. In light of how 
intertwined the role of business is with fundamental political-economic institutions and 
traditions, as discussed in CPE section (3.2), it is reasonable to expect a certain amount of 
institutional conflict when CSR is adopted in societies that are not predicated upon a neo-
liberal model. New-institutional theory offers a valuable perspective on how these internal 
institutional processes unfold.  
Brunsson  (1989) claims that adopting organizational mega-trends like CSR often follows a 
“logic of fashion” driven by symbolic politics: The actors try to project a certain image 
outwards that conforms to the expectations in their institutional environment, by adopting 
popular organizational concepts – or “rationalized myths” in Meyer and Rowan’s vocabulary 
(1977). Thus, organizations adopt such mega-trends because of the legitimacy that they confer 
upon the organization, regardless of whether they are effective or rational in terms of 
managing the actual production of the organization’s goods or services. This “logic of 
fashion” can therefore cause organizations to adopt organizational concepts that are 
incompatible with their internal practices. In such situations of incompatibility, new-
institutionalistss expect actors to resort to “double talk” or ceremonial adoption: They adopt 
the symbols and vestiges of the mega-trend outwardly in order to satisfy their institutional 
environments, but continue their internal practices unchanged in order to ensure operational 
efficiency within the organization (Brunsson, 1989; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).  
This “decoupling” between the externally projected image and the actual internal behavior is 
especially prevalent in situations where the adopted organizational concept is incompatible 
with existing norms and traditions of the organization. I argue that such incompatibility is a 
likely scenario in Nordic case material, because the Nordic tradition for a strong institutional 
embedding of the economy in many respects differs fundamentally from the Anglo-American, 
neoliberal model that underlies CSR. Thus, while a “logic of fashion” might compel Nordic 
companies and governments to adopt CSR, an institutional “logic of appropriateness” can lead 
to de-coupling, ceremonial adoption and resistance in the implementation, because CSR in 
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many respects is incompatible or inappropriate in a context of Nordic institutional norms. 
Thus, new-institutional theory provides an approach to analyze the processes that unfold when 
a presumably “alien” organizational concept collides with the local “logic of 
appropriateness.” Understanding these processes is important to explain the complex 
mechanisms and dynamics that link political-economic institutions to CSR practices, as 
outlined in research question 2 (Section 1.1.). Normative and historical new-institutional 
theories will therefore inform the analysis of the Nordic variety of CSR, as a complement to 
CPE theories.  
In relation to the research questions posed in Section 1.1., one can derive the following 
expectations from new-institutional theory: Regarding question 1), new-institutionalists 
expect no significant cross-national variation due to political-economic institutions, because 
they see CSR as a mega-trend that creates global convergence in organizational practices 
regardless of institutional background. Regarding question 2, new-institutionalists predict 
internal conflicts related to CSR in social-democratic societies, because of incompatibility 
with neoliberal norms implied by CSR. However, they expect outward convergence in CSR 
practices, because internal conflicts are resolved by double talk/decoupling. In relation to the 
final question, new-institutionalists expect the actors’ regulatory preferences for voluntary 
versus mandatory regulation to mirror the actors’ degree of exposure to CSR’s organizational 
field.  
As can be discerned by the above discussion, both CPE and new-institutional theory analyze 
how organizations adapt to their institutional environments. However, they reach 
diametrically opposite conclusions: From a new-institutional perspective, CSR is the 
archetypical global mega-trend that organizations eagerly adopt to increase their legitimacy, 
whereas CPE predicts CSR to meet with little enthusiasm outside the neo-liberal countries. 
Thus, where CPE predicts divergence in organizational practices, new-institutional theory 
predicts global convergence in organizational forms and management practices. This 
disagreement must be discussed before I combine the theories in the analytical framework.  
3.4. Global convergence versus divergence in organizational practices  
In reviewing new-institutionalist and CPE approaches to global convergence versus 
divergence in organizational practices, Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) conclude that the two 
approaches successfully can combine in a way that moves them beyond the convergence-
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divergence dichotomy. In the following, I review how the two perspectives contrast and 
complement each other, and argue that theories from the so-called “Scandinavian 
institutionalism” provide an approach that can encompass the new-institutionalist arguments 
of convergence , as well as CPEs arguments for divergence, in a way that meets some of the 
criticisms raised against the two theories. In this respect, I argue that Nordic material provides 
an ideal testing ground.  
CPE emphasizes how organizations adapt to structural-regulative institutions, such as the 
welfare state, the corporatist system or the financial system. These institutions are all 
anchored in the nation state, giving CPE a distinctly national approach. Furthermore, the firm-
centered CPE theories approach organizational practices from a rational-choice perspective, 
and tend to focus on strategic behavior in the adaptation process, looking at how firms 
position their strategies in a way that takes advantage of their institutional environment (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001). The logical conclusion to this argument is that actors resist change: The 
actors have vested interests in retaining the structural-regulative institutions in their present 
form, because they have adapted their strategies and behavior according to these institutions. 
Consequently, CPE authors expect continued cross-national divergence in organizational 
practices, and see political-economic institutions as being self-reinforcing and of a relatively 
perpetual nature, because they also shape how the actors respond to new challenges (Aoki, 
2001; Esping-Andersen, 1996). In particular, authors would not expect an organizational trend 
to be widely adopted in an institutional environment where it is not particularly compatible. In 
terms of CSR, with its close affiliation to the neo-liberal model, CPE scholars would not 
expect CSR to catch on in coordinated market economies, collaborative business systems, or 
social-democratic welfare states, such as the Nordic countries. However, this presumption of a 
rather closed feedback-loop between organizational behavior and political-economic 
institutions causes critics to claim that CPE theory is unable to account for institutional 
change, and also neglects agency and transnational influences on economic behavior (Tempel 
& Walgenbach, 2007).  
In contrast, new-institutional theory is more directly concerned with institutional processes, 
and emphasizes the normative-cognitive aspects of institutions. The analytical focus is 
legitimacy in the adaptation process, looking at how organizations try to position themselves 
in a way that corresponds to institutionalized expectations and norms. Furthermore, new-
institutionalists do not restrict their analyses to national institutions; they delineate their area 
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of study to organizational fields. This is a much wider focus than CPE’s focus on nation 
states. It covers those organizations which “in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life” (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:143). Within CSR, the organizational field 
extends to a global discourse involving multilateral institutions, multinational firms, think 
tanks, civil society organizations, academics and consultants. Consequently, from a new-
institutional perspective, CSR is the ideal candidate to produce global convergence in 
organizational practices: CSR has a global organizational field and strong legitimizing power 
because of its popularity with high-profile companies, business associations, governments, 
civil society and multilateral organizations. However, new-institutionalism is often criticized 
for neglecting to study the influence of domestic political-economic institutions cross-
nationally, which could uncover more divergence in organizational practices (Czarniawska & 
Sevón, 1996; Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007). 
The Nordic countries offer an interesting testing ground for this convergence-divergence 
conundrum: CPE expects Nordic actors to resist CSR due to the strong Nordic institutional 
embedding of the economy, leading to continued cross-national divergence. In contrast, new-
institutionalism expects Nordic actors eagerly to adopt CSR: These actors are heavily exposed 
to the global organizational field of CSR due to the strong global orientation of Nordic 
companies, as well as the strong international engagement in social and environmental politics 
among Nordic governments and NGOs. From a new-institutional perspective, it therefore 
seems that coercive, mimetic, normative processes will pressure Nordic actors to adopt CSR – 
at the same time as deeply rooted norms and traditions in Nordic political-economic 
institutions appear incompatible with CSR’s neo-liberal heritage. In such situations of 
incompatibility between external expectations and the internal practices, new-institutional 
theory predicts the “logic of fashion” to pressure Nordic organizations to adopt CSR, while 
the “logic of appropriateness” causes the actors  “decouple” of the externally projected image 
from their actual internal practices. In other words, new-institutionalism, like CPE, expects 
continued divergence in terms of actual internal behavior.  
New-institutional theory is therefore liable to the same criticism of being unable to explain 
institutional change. In particular, the concept of “decoupling” reflects a rather deterministic 
view of organizations as being governed by the “iron cage” of their institutional environment. 
Critics therefore claim that new-institutionalism portrays organizational change in an overly 
simplistic way that disregards the roles of agency and institutional entrepreneurs. Instead, 
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critics claim one needs to analyze how organizational mega-trends are interpreted or 
“translated,” when they are adopted and implemented in different national contexts 
(Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002).  
This thesis therefore draws on recent theory developments within new-institutional theory, 
often called “Scandinavian institutionalism” (Boxenbaum & Strandgaard, 2007; Scheuer, 
2007). This strand of new-institutionalism builds on normative or historical new-
institutionalism described in section 3.3., but analyzes more in-depth the complex twin 
processes involved in global diffusion and national adaptation of organizational mega-trends 
in a way that better incorporates CPE’s insights to the role of political-economic institutions. 
In particular, authors emphasize the process of “translation” that takes place within an 
organization as it adopts and implements a new organizational idea. Global mega-trends are 
often highly abstract and general, leaving substantial leeway for national interpretations 
(Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Røvik, 2002). If incompatible with the existing institutional 
norms, traditions and practices, these global concepts are not necessarily destined to be 
rejected internally through double talk or decoupling: These global concepts can also go 
through a process of “translation” whereby the actors actively interpret, edit, and adapt the 
new organizational concept to the local institutional realities (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; 
Røvik, 2002; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002). This perspective opens up for agency and 
institutional entrepreneurs in the processes of divergence and change within the globally 
diffusing management trends. This idea of an active local “translation,” whereby actors adapt 
a global concept to their local logic of appropriateness, seems particularly relevant since CSR 
touches upon deep-seated perceptions of the proper role of business in society, as discussed in 
section 3.2. Thus, while retaining conformity with the global CSR-trend outwards, the actors’ 
internal interpretation and practice of CSR can, through this process of translation, 
significantly diverge from the original CSR concept. Consequently, understanding how actors 
try to make CSR compatible with the existing institutional ethos, practices and expectations, 
can explain some of the observed cross-national variation in CSR. 
To conclude, the question of CSR’s institutional antecedents has increasingly caught the 
attention of CSR scholars within the social sciences, leading to a recognition of the role of 
political-economic institutions in explaining CSR practices. However, authors disagree on 
how to measure cross-national CSR practices, as well as in their conclusions regarding the 
causal relationship between political-economic institutions and CSR. Analyses at the time I 
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conceptualized the project were either purely theoretical or based on case studies of a handful 
of companies or countries, which may explain some of their contradictory conclusions. 
Hence, there was a need for comparable company-level data from countries with different 
political-economic systems, combined with systematic, comparative analysis. In the following 
outline of the analytical framework, I argue how the political economy of CSR can be studied 
in practice.  
4. Analytical framework – the political economy of CSR 
Taking mainstream CSR theories within the business and management disciplines as a 
starting point, the important explanatory factors would be firm- or industry-specific, such as 
brand dependence, market segmentation, and production in high-risk markets or controversial 
industries. In parallel, the important explanatory factors in IPE, relate to global structural 
conditions. Seeing CSR as a functional response to criticism leveled at the global capitalist 
system, IPE literature leads one to expect globally oriented companies with a high public 
profile to be more susceptible to this criticism, and hence to have a stronger incentive to 
engage in CSR. In parallel, new-institutional theory would focus on factors related to the 
organizational field of CSR, which is also strongly global in character. Thus, neither IPE nor 
new-institutional theory sees national political-economic institutions as strong explanatory 
factors for cross-national divergence in CSR. Instead, they expect such divergence to be an 
aggregate effect of either the nation’s proportion of actors that are highly susceptible to 
pressures from the global marketplace (IPE) or the nation’s proportion of actors that are 
strongly exposed to the organizational field of CSR (new-institutionalism). 
Recent studies in comparative CSR do to some extent refute this position, as they are able to 
demonstrate substantial national differences in CSR practices – differences which the authors 
relate to national institutional dynamics. For instance, Bammer and Pavelin report significant 
cross-national differences in corporate CSR communication (Brammer & Pavelin, 2005), 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) find differences in corporate governance systems, and Midttun, 
Gautesen, and Gjølberg (2006) find cross-national differences in CSR practices that parallel 
the nations’ political-economic institutions. Consequently, there seems to be sufficient 
evidence for the claim that nationally based institutions do matter to CSR (Campbell, 2007). 
There also seems to be consensus regarding which political-economic institutions matter, as 
these analyses tend to draw heavily on well-established theories within CPE, emphasizing the 
role of the welfare state, the nature of industrial relations system, and the strength of the civil 
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society. Researchers also point to institutions more closely related to firm-centered factors 
derived from the varieties of capitalism literature, such as corporate governance, financial 
systems and vocational training systems. These political-economic institutions share the 
attribute that they all reflect different aspects of the institutional embedding of the economy. 
The underlying theoretical argument shared by these authors is that the degree of institutional 
embedding of the economy influences CSR practices. This argument is also the guiding 
principle in this dissertation’s analytical framework.  
However, while the CPE literature gives good directions as to which institutions might be 
relevant, there is no consensus on whether the effect of institutional embedding is positive or 
negative, and little attention is devoted to the mechanisms that link institutions to CSR 
performance. In order to address these issues, this dissertation develops an integrated 
analytical framework to study the institutional antecedents of CSR that combines perspectives 
from IPE, CPE and new-institutional theory . Figure 1 summarizes my main theoretical and 
empirical argument for the thesis as a whole, whereas the individual articles address more in 
depth the different aspects of the argument.  
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: 
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STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS 
I emphasize two structural conditions as a background for why actors from business, 
government and civil society take an interest in CSR. Both revolve around the changes in 
society’s expectations towards the roles and responsibilities of business. First, I use IPE 
theories on economic globalisation to explain why CSR emerges as a functional response to 
the new challenges of global value chains and to the criticism of corporate unaccountability in 
an increasingly liberalized business environment, as explained in section 3.1. Second, I use 
perspectives from new-institutional theory to explain how CSR gains status as a global mega-
trend whereby coercive and mimetic isomorphism and normative pressures establish CSR as a 
“must” for companies wanting to be perceived as legitimate and modern. These structural 
conditions figure mainly as background factors to explain the rise of CSR globally, and they 
are not analyzed specifically in the empirical studies.  
CAUSAL FACTORS 
The degree of institutional embedding of the economy is the key explanatory factor across all 
four articles. As outlined in section 3.4., I expect strong institutions for embedding the 
economy to strengthen the actors’ CSR practices, due to these institutions’ structural-
regulative effects as well as their normative-cognitive effects. Three political-economic 
institutions are studied as causal factors in the embedding argument, as specified below.  
The first factor is the welfare state, described as “the principal institution in the construction 
of different models of post-war capitalism” (Manow, 2001) and considered a crucial 
component in the creation of distinctive national business systems and capabilities in firms 
(Whitley, 1998; 1999). In line with Campbell’s (2007) arguments, I expect strong welfare 
states to have stricter policies and enforcement that is more stringent in a broad range of 
policy areas relevant to CSR, such as environmental protection, health and safety, working 
conditions, discrimination and corruption. Strict policies consequently improve the 
performance of domestic companies in these areas, resulting by default in an objectively 
higher performance in the average domestic company. While improved performance due to 
mandatory action would not be classified as “CSR” in a national context, it might well be 
classified as “CSR” in the global marketplace, where these actions may not be mandatory. 
This discrepancy between national and global regulations thus makes it easier for actors from 
strong welfare states to excel in their CSR activities. Specifically, companies from strong 
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welfare states are expected to have a high level of performance and experience in social and 
environmental issues when CSR hits the agenda, merely as a function of their having adapted 
to an institutional environment with bigger sticks and bigger carrots. In parallel, governments 
from strong welfare states are expected to show a stronger commitment to CSR, due to their 
generally stronger social and environmental political agendas. Furthermore, strong welfare 
states generally employ a broader range of “next-generation” policy instruments, such as 
incentive schemes, voluntary agreements, education schemes, etc. (Bemelmans-Videc, 1998). 
These kinds of policy instruments are characteristic of CSR policies, and I therefore expect 
governments from strong welfare states to have more experience in policy tools that are 
relevant to promoting CSR.  
 
The corporatist system is a second institution that may be relevant to CSR practices. Labor 
unions as well as employers’ associations can have an important advocacy role in promoting 
higher labor standards and other social issues (Campbell, 2007), and stronger tripartite 
organizations will have a stronger influence. However, I argue that it is primarily the 
dialogue- and consensus-building effect of corporatism that influences CSR. Strong tripartite 
institutions teach, and to some extent force, business to integrate broader societal concerns 
into their business operations. Such traditions may enhance corporate competence in dialogue 
and consensus-oriented strategies, which are important “CSR-skills” in stakeholder 
management and in balancing the “triple bottom line”. Furthermore, the generally closer 
involvement of business and labor as well as NGOs in policy-making in corporatist countries 
holds business more accountable to the public. I therefore expect strong corporatist traditions 
to strengthen CSR practices.  
Third, culture, norms and values are indispensable to the functioning of political-economic 
institutions (Rokkan, 1987), and the question of political culture is an integral part of CPE 
(Jackman & Miller, 1996). In relation to CSR, NGOs, active public debate and high consumer 
awareness are held as important drivers for CSR because they provide stronger incentives for 
business to include social and environmental concerns in their long-term strategies. Strong 
traditions for active engagement from civil society, NGOs and media can therefore lead to an 
early uptake of the CSR in both business and governments, because of stronger expectations 
in home markets and political constituencies respectively.  
MECHANISMS 
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Moving on to the more qualitative aspects of the institutional processes and dynamics of CSR, 
I propose two kinds of mechanisms that influence the actors’ approach to CSR and thereby 
link political-economic institutions to CSR practices. First, I argue that the concept of 
comparative institutional advantages, as outlined in section 3.2, is a mechanism that 
establishes a causal chain between political-economic institutions and CSR practices. This 
mechanism is based on consequentialist logic that mainly relates to the structural-regulative 
effects of institutions, as discussed in Articles 2 and 4.  
Second, I argue that a norm-driven “logic of appropriateness” is a mechanism that establishes 
a link between political-economic institutions and CSR practices. Political-economic 
institutions are pivotal normative expressions of expectations towards the role of business in 
society (Kagan et al., 2003; Aguilera et al., 2007). I therefore also look at how 
institutionalized norms and expectations affect the actors’ approach to CSR, from the 
perspective of a “logic of appropriateness,” analyzing how the actors justify their actions and 
positions in terms of what the actors refer to as considered natural, appropriate, or just by their 
institutional environments. Compared to the mainly utilitarian concept of comparative 
institutional advantages, the “logic of appropriateness” opens for a more normatively driven 
motivation for the actors to engage in CSR, emphasizing the normative-cognitive effects of 
institutions. This mechanism is central to my reasoning in Article 3, and to a lesser extent in 
Article 2 and 4. 
OUTCOMES 
Based on the causal factors and mechanisms identified above, I specify expected outcomes as 
follows: In terms of CSR practices generally, the analytical framework leads one to expect the 
actors’ CSR practices to parallel the strengths and weaknesses of their political-economic 
institutions. As outlined in section 3.4., I expect a strong institutional embedding of 
companies to strengthen the actors’ CSR practices. More specifically, in terms of CSR 
performance, I expect higher CSR performance in companies emanating from countries with 
strong institutions for embedding of the economy, because of the proposed comparative 
institutional advantages stemming from strong embedding. These outcomes are studied in 
Articles 1, 2, and 4. In parallel, I expect governments in countries with strong embedding of 
the economy to adopt the CSR agenda early as part of their public policy, and to have high 
policy ambitions. Finally, in terms of perceptions of CSR, I expect the institutional 
environment of the actors from countries with strong institutions for embedding the economy 
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to influence their perceptions of CSR, leading to support for regulatory, tripartite approaches, 
and potentially to skepticism towards voluntary approaches to corporate responsibility, as 
analyzed in Articles 3 and 4. 
5. Findings  
Article 1:  
Gjølberg, Maria (2009): Measuring the immeasurable? Constructing an index of CSR 
practices and CSR performance in 20 countries. Scandinavian Journal of Management  
25, 10–22 
An analysis of the political-economic antecedents of CSR requires a valid measure of cross-
national variation in CSR practices. The first article therefore has a very specific goal: To 
develop a valid method to measure CSR practices at the national level, for use in comparative 
analysis. Based on a discussion of the numerous conceptual, methodological and technical 
challenges related to such a measure, the article develops an index of CSR practices and 
performance across 20 OECD nations.  
As discussed in Section 1, CSR authors do not agree on a common definition of CSR. 
Consequently, there is no established method for measuring CSR at the company level, nor at 
the national level, which can serve as a basis to measure CSR practices cross-nationally. A 
further challenge is the lack of reliable and comparable data at the company level. 
Recognizing these definitional and empirical challenges, the article arrives at an alternative 
approach based on a formative measurement model: The index treats the most globally 
recognised CSR initiatives as proxies for “CSR”, simply letting the selected CSR initiatives 
define CSR for the purpose of measurement construction.  In doing so, the index construction 
sidesteps the many normative aspects of defining CSR. In practice, I use corporate adoption, 
qualification and membership in the most prominent global CSR initiatives as proxies, as 
detailed below. 
The “Index of cross-national CSR practices” comprise corporate representation, by nation, in 
the following nine initiatives: The Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the FTSE4Good, the 
Global Reporting Initiative database, the UN Global Compact, the ISO14000, the KPMG 
survey of national CSR reporting practices, and membership in the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, the list of “100 Most Sustainable Corporations” and 
SustainAbility’s “top 50 CSR reports.” 
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The index measures the degree to which a nation is over- or under-represented in these nine 
initiatives, relative to the size of the nation’s economy. I arrive at the national scores by 
calculating each of the 20 nations’ proportion of companies represented in the nine initiatives, 
relative to the 20 nations covered. To correct for differences in economic size, I divide the 
scores by each nation’s proportion of GDP, relative to the 20 nations covered. Based on all 
nine initiatives, this method produces an index that expresses the proportion of companies 
active in CSR per country. However, in order to get specific information on cross-national 
CSR performance, I used the same method to develop a second index where I include only the 
CSR initiatives that require documentable achievements in CSR. 
Thus, notwithstanding Crane et al.’s claim that defining CSR is a normative exercise, this 
article is mainly a technical exercise dedicated to the discussion of definitional, conceptual 
and methodological solutions to ensure the validity of the indices. Nevertheless, both indices 
reveal striking differences in CSR practices and CSR performance across the 20 nations, 
thereby indicating a need to explore the influence of domestic institutions on CSR – the topic 
of Article 2.  
 
Article 2  
Gjølberg, Maria (2009): The origin of corporate social responsibility: global forces or 
national legacies? Socio-Economic Review. 1–33 
This article takes the findings in Article 1 as its starting point, and analyzes the relevance of 
domestic, political-economic institutions in explaining the observed differences in CSR 
performance. To do so, I formulate two alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of 
national CSR performance as measured in the “Index of national CSR performance” 
developed in Article 1.  
First, I derive a “globalist hypothesis” from theories within IPE and business and management 
literature. This literature sees CSR as a functional response to the challenges of an 
increasingly globalised economy: To respond to anti-corporate and anti-globalization 
sentiments, and to ensure the smooth functioning of increasingly global value chains, 
companies must go beyond legal compliance to be perceived as legitimate actors. Logically, it 
follows that if CSR is a response to the new challenges presented by a globalised economy, 
then the most globalised companies will have the greatest self-interest in investing in good 
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CSR practices. Aggregated to the national level, the globalist hypothesis predicts that the 
countries with the highest proportion of globalised companies will top the “Index of CSR 
performance.”  
As an alternative CPE-derived hypothesis, I derive an “institutionalist hypothesis,” which 
proposes that strong institutions for embedding of the economy provide companies with a 
comparative institutional advantage in CSR. For example, a strong embedding of the 
economy implies stricter formal and informal control of corporate practices in a number of 
areas related to CSR, such as environmental protection, HSE, labor standards, discrimination, 
and corruption. Consequently, by default, one can expect the average company from strongly 
embedded economies to have more experience and higher performance levels in social and 
environmental areas when CSR hits the corporate agenda, simply because of their institutional 
environment. In empirical terms, I measure “strong institutional embedding of the economy” 
as countries with social-democratic welfare states and strong scores on environmental policy 
measures (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1998, ESI 2005), strong corporatist traditions 
(Siaroff, 1999), and a strong score on political activism and environmentalism in measures of 
political culture (Inglehart, 2003). The institutionalist hypothesis predicts that countries with 
strong embedding of their economies will top the Index of CSR performance.  
Methodologically, this article attracts several of the pervasive methodological challenges of 
CPE, especially those related to small-N and causal complexity. To address these issues, I 
tested the hypotheses using fuzzy-set QCA, which did indeed reveal causal heterogeneity in 
the material: The empirical analysis lends support to both the globalist and the institutionalist 
hypotheses, but for two quite different subsets of countries. While the globalist hypothesis 
seems to explain the high index scores of the Netherlands, UK and Switzerland, the 
institutionalist hypothesis seems to give a better explanation for the high scores of the Nordic 
countries. Thus, the analysis underlines the importance of a contextually informed approach 
to CSR: The degree of exposure to global markets as well as domestic, political-economic 
factors influence CSR performance.  
 
Article 3 
Gjølberg, Maria (2010): Varieties of corporate social responsibility (CSR): CSR meets 
the “Nordic Model.” Regulation & Governance 4, 203–229 
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Intending to investigate the findings related to the institutionalist hypothesis (Article 2), 
Article 3 provides more in-depth knowledge of countries with strong institutional embedding 
of the economy. Arguing the Nordic countries as a critical case, the article explores how 
governments, but also trade unions, business associations and civil society organizations 
approach CSR across the four Nordic countries.  
This article is inspired by new-institutional theory, and seeks to understand how pre-existing 
political-economic institutions and cultural norms affect the actors’ interpretation of CSR. 
CSR, largely being a business-driven concept ideologically affiliated with the neo-liberal 
model, does in many ways conflict with the Nordic tradition for strong social embedding of 
the economy. Whereas CSR promotes corporate self-regulation and allocates significant 
discretionary powers to business, the “Nordic model” is known for its strong social and 
environmental regulation through the welfare state, strong corporatist systems and active 
governmental involvement in the business community. The Nordic countries represent an 
institutional context that differs substantially from the socio-political model that underlies 
CSR, and these countries are therefore ideal to highlight political-economic aspects of CSR.  
The article focuses on the Nordic governments, and sets out by developing a typology of four 
possible government interpretations of CSR. The empirical analysis reveals that Nordic public 
policy on CSR spans three of the four categories. As such, there is no ground to claim that 
there exists a common Nordic public policy on CSR. Sweden and Norway feature a 
normative, humanitarian approach to CSR, which aims to promote sustainable development, 
human rights and good governance, led by their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In contrast, 
Denmark and Finland feature an instrumental, business-minded policy model aiming to 
increase their business communities’ innovation and international competitiveness.  
However, looking beyond concrete policy formulations, the interviewees show a striking 
similarity in their conceptualization or “translation” of CSR. Regardless of nationality and 
affiliation, interviewees tend to explain their views of CSR by referring to “The Nordic 
Model,” pointing to both its structural-regulatory aspects, as well as to its normative-cognitive 
aspects. The analysis uncovers three characteristics that define this “Nordic variety of CSR”: 
First, the interviewees consider CSR as largely irrelevant and superfluous in their domestic 
contexts, where they see regulations and corporatist agreements as sufficient. A majority of 
interviewees also sees regulations and corporatism as clearly preferable to CSR, and describes 
41
  
CSR as a “second best” solution mainly relevant outside the Nordic context. Many 
interviewees are skeptical of CSR as an alternative to state regulation and corporatist 
agreements. In this context, interviewees see CSR as an unwanted resort to paternalism and 
charity – an unacceptable abdication of fundamental and indivisible government 
responsibility for the welfare of the nation. Second, CSR is clearly filtered through traditional 
Nordic political-economic institutions and traditions. For instance the governments 
extensively use the tripartite system for corporatist consultation in their policy initiatives. 
Third, the strong internationalist traditions of the Nordic countries are evident in the striking 
emphasis on multilateral institutions and initiatives. In particular, there is strong support for 
international norm processes and juridification of CSR, in contrast to the Anglo-American 
CSR concept that focuses on voluntary action and business discretion.  
The analysis concludes that CSR strongly interfaces with both political-economic institutions 
and the ideologies that underpin them. Consequently, my findings strengthen the call for a 
more contextually informed approach to CSR, as political-economic institutions clearly affect 
the practices and the perceptions of CSR in Nordic governments, labor unions, employers’ 
associations, and NGOs.  
 
Article 4:  
 
Gjølberg, Maria (2011): Explaining regulatory preferences: CSR, soft law, or hard law? 
– Insights from a survey of Nordic pioneers in CSR. Business and Politics, Issue 2.  
Article 4 examines Nordic companies more closely and aims to understand how political-
economic institutions influence their CSR practices as well as their regulatory preferences. 
The Nordic societies have a tradition of strong institutional embedding of the economy, and 
they might therefore provide a fresh perspective on CSR as a political phenomenon, in 
particular regarding the companies’ perceptions of CSR, soft law, and hard law, which may 
differ from the perceptions of companies in societies with a more neo-liberal political 
economy.  
The article is based on a survey of the Nordic companies with the highest scores in 
international performance-based CSR rankings. In terms of general CSR practices, the 
companies do not appear to diverge from what one would expect of other international 
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pioneers in CSR. However, their perceptions of CSR reveal a surprisingly strong skepticism 
towards CSR, voluntary approaches and self-regulation, combined with a clear preference for 
mandatory regulation to ensure decent social and environmental standards. In parallel to their 
governments, (Article 3), the Nordic companies do not see CSR as either a viable or a 
legitimate alternative to state regulation. This preference for regulation can partly be 
explained by social norms and cultural expectations of Nordic society, and 78 percent 
consider their Nordic background to affect how they work with CSR. This finding indicates 
that the domestic context is strongly relevant to understand CSR practices. However, the 
respondents clearly indicate corporate self-interest as the prime cause of their support for 
increased regulation. Being pioneers in CSR, the companies perceive themselves as being 
above compliance with any conceivable future regulations. Consequently, such regulations 
would level the playing field to their benefit and strengthen their competitive position in 
domestic and international markets.  
Furthermore, when asked to explain their high performance in CSR, the companies 
consistently point to three factors: 1) the strict domestic state-regulation of social and 
environmental practices, 2) the role of corporatist negotiations in securing a triple bottom line, 
and 3) strong normative expectations towards corporate responsibility in their home markets. 
For these reasons, 68 percent of the companies perceive their Nordic background as an 
advantage to CSR success, thus supporting the claim that strong institutions for social 
embedding of the economy constitute a comparative institutional advantage in CSR.  
6. Methods 
The PhD project comprises four articles using four methodological approaches. This multi-
method approach was both a function of the nature of the research questions, as well as a 
desire to address the most pressing knowledge gaps in comparative CSR. The following 
sections will review the broader ontological basis that underlies the project, before detailing 
the specific methodological challenges and limitations of the individual articles.  
6.1. The ontology of comparative analysis 
The project as a whole is firmly rooted within the traditions of the comparative method, even 
though it also uses quantitative and qualitative methods. The comparative method occupies an 
intermediate position in social sciences. Ragin (2000) identifies two main methodological 
approaches: the case-oriented, qualitative approach, and the variable-oriented, quantitative 
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approach, which are both frequently used in comparative studies. This division between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, between ideographic and nomological approaches, 
has deep roots in the philosophy of science (Mjøset, 2006). Ragin, however, argues for a 
separate category for the “comparative method” in between the two main categories, as a 
“diversity-oriented,” approach. This comparative method aims at middle range generalizations 
and theory, in the tradition of Merton and Boudon, but not at the expense of complexity in 
cases and causes.  
Quantitative approaches have a strong position in comparative studies, and a regression-based 
analysis would be the standard approach, especially in relation to research question 1 
regarding the extent to which political-economic institutions influence CSR practices across 
20 nations. However, there are several problems with using the standard, quantitative 
approaches in comparative analysis, problems that run deeper than the pervasive technical 
problems associated with small-N comparative studies (Shalev, 2006). The primary 
shortcoming of most quantitative approaches in relation to my project is the assumption of 
linearity, additivity, and causal homogeneity. While these assumptions are justified in many 
quantitative studies, most theories in comparative political economy do not correspond to a 
linear model of reality. Simply put, one would not expect a 10-percent increase in the strength 
of labor unions to have the same effect in Sweden as in the United States. Instead, causal 
heterogeneity, elective affinities, path dependencies and reciprocal causation dominate the 
models proposed by most comparative researchers (Abbott, 1988; Shalev, 2006). Despite this, 
the standard regression models remain the dominant methodology in CPE. It is precisely this 
mismatch that Peter Hall addresses in his call for an alignment of ontology and methodology 
in comparative research, claiming that: “The ontologies of comparative politics have 
substantially outrun its methodologies” (Hall, 2002, p. 375). In other words, the rather 
restrictive assumptions of the established methods do not match the research community’s 
view of the social and political world. Thus, alternative methods, which correspond to the 
ontological underpinnings of the analysis, are called for, especially in relation to research 
question 1. 
Shalev (2006) argues for a return to more “low-tech” methods in comparative analysis, such 
as charts, tables, diagrams and typologies. The aim is to retain the identity of the cases 
throughout the analysis. In standard regression approaches the cases’ identities “disappear 
into the magician’s hat of variable-based causality, where they hide during the analysis, only 
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to be reproduced with a flourish in the article’s closing paragraphs (Abbott, 2001, p. 98).” In 
contrast, knowing the identity of the cases throughout the analysis allows for Ragin’s (2000) 
“a dialogue between ideas and evidence.” This is important, he claims, because knowing the 
identity of the cases keeps the analytical process more “grounded” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
However, compared to the inductive ideals of grounded theory, Ragin introduces theory 
testing much more actively in the analytical process. My dialogue between ideas and evidence 
was secured primarily by using scatter plots and charts in the preliminary data analysis of 
research question 1) in Article 21  as well as by developing a typology in Article 3. 
The most advanced comparative method is set forth in Charles Ragin’s (2000) synthesis of 
qualitative and quantitative methods, called Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA 
approaches causation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and depicts causation as 
conjunctural and heterogeneous. The basic idea of QCA is to identify configurations of 
causes, to allow for the fact that, “Causes may combine in different and sometimes 
contradictory ways to generate the same outcome” (Ragin 2000:14). This configurational 
approach is an explicit rebuttal of the standard quantitative, variable-oriented method and its 
ontology. Ragin’s unique contribution is to combine a detached, formalistic analysis based on 
the logic of set-theoretic, Boolean algebra, with a much more qualitative and theory-infused 
categorization of the data material. While this is a contested method, it is highly relevant for 
my analysis in Article 2, given the data material’s strong indication of causal heterogeneity 
and my theoretical ambition to identify whether different causal pathways can lead to the 
same outcome in terms of CSR performance.  
6.2. Middle-range theories, mechanisms and causal processes 
Most social scientists agree that a search for covering laws in comparative analyses is an 
unproductive imitation of the natural sciences. However, this does not mean that one has to 
revert to “mere” description. The most forceful arguments for this position are set forth by 
Robert Merton in his writings on “middle-range theories” and mechanism-based explanations 
(Boudon 1991). Merton attempted to locate a middle ground between the highly abstract 
deductive-nomological approaches, and the under-theorized empirical works of his 
contemporary American colleagues (Calhoun 2002). Instead, he argues for middle-range 
theories. By seeking to develop as generalized statements as possible within the empirical 
                                                 
1 This preliminary analysis is not described in the published articles.  
45
  
context, these theories are less ambitious than “grand theories,” but still more ambitious than 
descriptive approaches.  
Mayntz (2004) claim tha causal generalizations of social macro-phenomena are dominated by 
rational-choice approaches and by correlation approaches focusing on statistical associations, 
and that both approaches fail to explain the causal processes involved in situations where 
institutions play a decisive role – a highly relevant point in relation to my project. She argues 
that researchers should search for generative mechanisms in the study of social macro-
phenomena. These mechanism-based explanations focus on the processes involved in the 
causal chain, and seek to identify the mechanisms that generate the phenomena under 
investigation (Manyntz 2004).  
This concept of “mechanism” is crucial to middle-range theory. As Bunge (2004:202) puts it: 
“No law, no possible mechanism; and no mechanism, no explanation.” A key ambition of my 
project is to identify the mechanisms that link political-economic institutions to CSR 
practices, and mechanisms are therefore a key explanatory component in my analytical 
framework. In this respect, my approach to mechanisms and causal reconstruction is inspired 
by Hall’s “systemic process analysis” – a  mechanism-based approach tailored specifically to 
analyses in which institutions play an important role (Hall, 2002). Hall’s approach is an 
explicit effort to solve the mismatch between ontology and methodology in contemporary 
comparative research as outlined above. His central premise is that the essence of explanation 
lies in explicating the mechanisms that link one phenomenon to another, and that these 
mechanisms can be identified through “a three-cornered contest between one theory, as set of 
observations, and a second theory rival to the first” (ibid:21). This approach implies a 
positivist ideal of active confrontations between theory and data, but in the more grounded 
sense of a “dialogue between ideas and evidence,” as advocated by Ragin (2000). In relation 
to my project, mechanisms are a key component to the explanations of both how and why 
political-economic institutions influence CSR practices cross-nationally (Article 2), and in the 
Nordic case studies (Articles 3 and 4). Specifically, I propose that political-economic 
institutions influence CSR practices through two mechanisms: First, I identify a normative 
mechanism whereby political-economic institutions create certain “logics or appropriateness” 
that influences the actors’ CSR practices by defining the boundaries of legitimate behavior. 
Second, I identify an instrumental mechanism, explaining how political-economic institutions 
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create certain “comparative institutional advantages” that influence the actors’ CSR practices 
by providing them with a particular set of institutional opportunities and barriers.  
In parallel to the “intermediate position” of comparative method and to the “middle-range” 
type of theories, the fundamental methodological view of my project is also placed in an 
intermediate position: As can be discerned from my analytical framework, my approach is 
inspired by authors who see individual behavior as strongly influenced by collective 
institutions. From this perspective, my approach seems closer to methodological collectivism, 
which is particularly evident in my arguments related to the mechanism based on a “logic of 
appropriateness,” and in new-institutional theory more broadly. However, my reasoning 
related to the mechanism based on a “comparative institutional advantage” is based on the 
varieties of capitalism literature. This literature is inspired by rational-choice theory, which is 
firmly anchored in methodological individualism. My analytical framework therefore contains 
elements from both methodological traditions.  
Finally, it is important to note that my use of hypotheses and deductive reasoning (especially 
in Article 2) does not reflect deductive approach. The main role of my use of modeling and 
hypotheses is inspired by Gibbard and Hal Varian’s idea of using such simplifying models as 
a communicative aide (Sugden, 2000). Thus, the use of models and deductions in my project 
does not reflect a true deductive approach per se, but is intended as an instrument to create 
consistent and stringent arguments in order to communicate more clearly with the established 
theory in the research area.  
6.3. Multiple methods 
As outlined in the introduction to this section, the methods I use span qualitative, quantitative 
and comparative traditions. Such multi-method approaches are praised by some for providing 
triangulation and robust results, while others remain skeptical of mixing methods. Using 
several methods simultaneously in the research process is controversial since it may combine 
methods with incompatible epistemological and ontological premises, especially when mixing 
qualitative and quantitative methods. However, the present project is only a mixed-method 
project when analyzed as a whole. In each of the individual articles, I use one method only. In 
doing so, I avoid the pitfalls of multiple methods, but gain some of its benefits by approaching 
the same over-arching research questions from four methodological perspectives. My research 
design is therefore closer to what Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) call multi-method research, 
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meaning that different methods are used in parallel or in sequence at different stages of 
answering the research questions, hopefully leading to a more robust analysis. Thus, the 
multi-method approach aims to achieve methodological triangulation in parallel with the 
theoretical triangulation represented in the analytical framework. To do so, the project 
comprises a quite diverse set of methodological tools, which I will review separately below.  
Article 1 – Index construction 
The key methodological challenge in Article 1 was to find a valid measure, with reliable data 
of national CSR performance, in a field that provides no definite definition of CSR, no well-
established method to measure CSR practices in companies, and certainly no established 
method to measure CSR practices at a national level. The solution was to rely on a formative 
measurement model by using the most recognized global CSR initiatives that also provided 
the nationality of their members. Nine initiatives met these criteria, as listed in section 5. 
The index of CSR practices is by necessity a somewhat blunt measure of CSR practices, 
which contains several challenges, particularly related to language barriers. These biases are 
detailed along with the technical issues of index construction in the article and will not be 
repeated here. The most reliable results of the index will in my opinion be gained from 
replicating the index regularly to see how the national scores develop over time. Bluntness 
notwithstanding, the index does document substantial cross-national divergence in CSR 
practices that are highly relevant to the field of comparative CSR. In particular, it reveals 
interesting patterns when studying the sub-scores that lie behind the aggregate scores. To 
analyze these patterns, I develop a typology that categorizes the nine CSR initiatives 
according to their entry requirements and stated goals. Comparing national scores in the easy-
access CSR initiatives versus the more demanding CSR initiatives reveals important cross-
national variation, and based on this finding, I develop a second index, the “Index of CSR 
performance”. This index is based on data that is more reliable: Even though the performance 
ratings to a certain extent rely on corporate self-reporting, the companies must go through a 
third-party screening process to qualify for these initiatives, and this is therefore the preferred 
index for further analysis in Article 2. 
Article 2: Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis 
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Article 2 aims to analyze the results from the index of CSR performance constructed in 
Article 1, by contrasting an “institutionalist hypothesis” with a “globalist hypothesis.” This 
analysis involves many of the complex methodological challenges of comparative analysis.  
The main methodological challenge was to find a quantitative method that corresponds to the 
ontology of CPE theory while also providing valid results on a data material with only 19 
cases. In terms of ontology, the theories I draw on in Article 2 do not correspond to the linear 
model of reality implied in standard regression-based approaches, as discussed in Section 6.1. 
Moreover, initial data analysis of my material revealed multicollinearity and 
heteroskedastiticy in the dependent variables, several outliers and other technical problems 
associated with small-N studies. Consequently, multiple regression did not appear as a sound 
methodological choice. At the same time, the large number of cases, in combination with the 
quantitative nature of many of the CPE indicators used in the analysis, meant that qualitative 
case study was not a good choice either, because this approach would not have been able to 
utilize the data fully. Instead, I chose to use “qualitative comparative analysis” (QCA) as 
developed by Ragin (2000, 2008).  
QCA does not approach causation in terms of net effects, but rather looks for sufficient and 
necessary causes according to a set-theoretic logic. Furthermore, QCA allows for quantitative 
analysis of the data, but retains some of the qualities of qualitative methods, because of the 
researcher’s role in coding the data prior to the analysis. Here, QCA builds on the set-
theoretical logic, meaning that a case is either a member or not a member of a set. To 
exemplify: If one wants to analyze whether strong corporatism causes strong CSR 
performance, one codes each country as either member or non-member of the set of “strongly 
corporatist countries,” and as either member or non-member of the set of “countries with 
strong CSR performance.” The QCA program then analyzes, using Boolean algebra, whether 
strong corporatism is a necessary or sufficient condition for strong CSR performance. The 
“qualitative” element in QCA is introduced in the coding of the data: The researcher 
him/herself must decide where to draw the line between membership and non-membership. 
The weakness of this coding is that the researcher’s own biases can influence the coding. It is 
therefore imperative that the researcher disclose the coding in order for readers to be able to 
evaluate its validity. The strength of this approach is that the researcher can draw on his or her 
knowledge of the whole field of corporatism and CSR performance in coding the data, and 
thereby increase its precision and relevance. My approach was to combine analysis of the 
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relevant CPE literature with quantitative analysis of the countries’ distributions on each 
variable, to decide the cut-off points between members/non-members, as disclosed in the 
appendix to Article 2.  
Traditional QCA uses only dichotomies, also known as “crisp sets” (member/non-member 
dichotomy) whereas “fuzzy-set” QCA uses multichotomies – a more fine-grained scale from 
“fully in,” to “fully out” of the set of members/non-members. Thus, fuzzy-set QCA retains 
more data richness than crisp-set QCA.2 More importantly, the QCA analysis allows not only 
for single causation, but also for multiple causation by identifying whether a combination of 
variables constitutes a sufficient or necessary condition for the outcome to occur. To 
conclude, fuzzy-set QCA proved to be the method that corresponded best to the underlying 
assumptions in CPE theory, avoided many of the technical difficulties in quantitative analysis 
of small-N samples, and made maximum use of the data richness.   
Article 3: Qualitative interviews 
Article 3 aims to gain insights into how the content and meaning of CSR are adapted and 
transformed when CSR is introduced in social-democratic societies. The empirical material 
consists of over 70 interviews with government officials, labor unions, employer’s 
associations and NGOs. The key methodological challenge relates to qualitative interviewing 
and the use of qualitative data in forming generalizations.  
The first challenge was the fact that different researchers performed the interviews. I took part 
in all interviews is Norway and Denmark, but not in all interviews in Finland and Sweden. 
This is not an ideal situation in qualitative interviewing, but was necessary because of the 
large number of interviews. I nonetheless believe I have sufficient familiarity with the 
Swedish and Finnish material. All interviews in Sweden were taped and distributed, while all 
interviews in Finland were fully transcribed and translated into English or Swedish3. In order 
to improve my own familiarity with the Swedish and Finnish cases, I also conducted several 
follow-up interviews by phone and e-mail. The benefit of this larger group of involved 
researchers was that it allowed for the joint discussion of the material among researchers with 
extensive knowledge of their national cases.  
                                                 
2 Fussy-sets can be three-value, five-value, seven-value, or continuous. In Article 2, I use five-value fuzzy sets.  
3 Finnish is not part of the Scandinavian language group, and is therefore not understood in the other Nordic 
countries. 
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Regarding the interview process, the main challenge concerned the quality of the data. The 
interviews were conversational interviews structured according to a joint interview guide. In 
practice, however, the interview guide had a limited influence on the interviews, because the 
interviewees were all professionals with long experience and at times quite strong opinions on 
CSR. The involved researchers therefore to some extent abandoned the traditional ideal of a 
low-key, even passive researcher who lets the interviewees guide the conversation (Andersen, 
2006). Instead, after an initial passive phase in each interview, we chose a more active 
interview approach, asking critical questions and challenging the interviewees to respond to 
statements. This approach allowed for more information of direct relevance to the aim of 
getting a qualitative understanding, not only of concrete policies, but also of the interviewees’ 
perspectives, justifications, and ways of talking and framing CSR. Thus, a combination of 
passive and active interviewing proved to increase the relevance of the data, because this 
approach encouraged the interviewees to also discuss the values, norms, and beliefs they held 
in relation to CSR.  
Finally, there is a challenge related to generalizations based on qualitative data. My approach 
is close to the ideals advocated by “grounded theory,” although I did not perform the 
extensive coding prescribed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). My interpretations of the material 
are based on inductive reasoning, where I construct generalizations based on patterns in the 
interviews. Here, I approached the material from a constructivist position, as I was mainly 
interested in identifying the “logic of appropriateness” guiding the actors’ approach to CSR. 
The aim was to gain an understanding of how the actors adapt and translate CSR in order to 
fit the Nordic Model, as discussed in Section 3.4. In particular, I generalize the material into 
typologies, and derive the dimensions of the typology inductively based on the normative 
justifications of the interviewees.  
 
Article 4: Quantitative survey 
Article 4 aims to explore whether and how Nordic companies perceive Nordic political-
economic institutions as relevant to their CSR strategies, and to analyze under which 
conditions the companies actively support increased environmental and social regulation. The 
intended respondents were the Nordic companies with highest performance in CSR.  
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The main methodological challenges in this part of the project were in selecting the right 
companies and in formulating relevant, clear and non-biased questions for the questionnaire. 
Concerning the selection of companies, my aim was to study the Nordic “pioneers in CSR.” 
Since it was not feasible to research the actual practices of all Nordic companies, I needed 
indicators or proxies for high CSR performance. This issue was resolved in the same way as 
in the construction of the Index of CSR performance (Article 1), by treating the global CSR 
initiatives with the most demanding entry-requirements as proxy for “CSR performance.” The 
resulting selection comprises companies qualified for Dow Jones Sustainability Index, 
FTSE4Good, the list of “Global 100 most sustainable corporations,” SustainAbility’s top 50 
sustainability reports, and CSR reports with a GRI rating of B or higher. In order to increase 
the number of companies, I also included companies listed on the regional sustainability index 
of the Nordic Stock Exchanges (OMXSUSTAIN). The selection method suffers from many of 
the same problems as those in the index construction, and does not necessarily provide a 
representative picture of the total population of Nordic companies with high CSR 
performance. In particular, the selection criteria have a bias towards stock-listed companies 
and companies with an international orientation. However, all initiatives require some form of 
independent verification of performance, and were thus considered suitable to identify “CSR 
pioneers”.   
Second, there are several methodological challenges in constructing questionnaires. 
Presuming that the respondents have limited time available, the questions needed to be clear, 
interesting, answerable without requiring any research, and not too time consuming. I 
therefore sent a pilot test to a sample of companies, NGOs and other researchers within my 
CSR network. To make the results comparable, I ensured the questionnaire was sent directly 
to the main CSR manager in the company. The questionnaire mainly uses Likert scales, but a 
few questions also required written comments from the respondents to gain deeper insights 
into their perspectives on CSR. These written comments proved a crucial support to the 
quantitative findings, in particular in analyzing the question of a “Nordic comparative 
institutional advantage” and their regulatory preferences.  
Finally, I distributed the questionnaire on-line, which tend to generate low response rates 
(Shih & Fan, 2008). In order to convey the importance of the questionnaire, it was embraced 
by the four main business schools in the Nordic countries. Non-respondents received an e-
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mail reminder, and those who still not responded were followed up by a personal phone call. 
This approach resulted in a highly satisfactory response rate of 77.2 percent.  
Now that the methodological challenges and limitations have been discussed, it is time to 
evaluate the thesis’s contribution to the research field of comparative CSR.  
7. Contributions 
How does this dissertation contribute to the field of comparative CSR? It is now time to 
revisit the three research questions I outlined in the introduction (Section 1.1.) to assess how 
the findings relate to current debates in the CSR literature.  
7.1. Cross-national variation in CSR – mirror or substitute?  
In the first research question I ask, “Do CSR practices vary significantly across countries, and 
if so, to what extent do political-economic institutions explain this variation?” Articles 1 and 2 
indicate a firm “yes” to the first part of this question, but find that political-economic 
institutions  provide only a partial answer to the second part of the question.  
Regarding the first part of the question, Article 1 clearly confirms the existence of cross-
national differences in CSR practices, as the indices document substantial variation both in 
CSR practices generally and CSR performance specifically. My main ambition in developing 
these indices was to provide a valid and reliable quantitative measure of CSR practices and 
performance across 20 advanced capitalist countries, in a field dominated by qualitative 
studies, many of which had questionable or undisclosed methodology. Most importantly, the 
indices provide a basis for the discussion of cross-national variation in CSR practices, which 
is also attested to by the frequent use of Articles 1 and 2 by other authors in comparative 
CSR.4  
The last part of the research question addresses the debate on the explanatory power of 
political-economic institutions in relation to cross-national variation in CSR practices. This 
question goes to the core of a vital, current debate in comparative CSR on the “political 
economy of CSR,” as reflected in the special issues of Socio-Economic Review and Business 
and Society (forthcoming).5 The CPE authors in the debates on the political economy of CSR 
                                                 
4 Article 2 is the 5th most cited article of the journal in which it was published (Socio-Economic Review), and its 
popularity inspired a special issue on political economy and CSR (personal communication with the editor, Prof. 
Gregory Jackson). 
5 Both expected in late 2011/early 2012, respectively. 
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share the underlying theoretical assumption that the degree of institutional embedding of the 
economy affects companies’ CSR practices and performance, which is also the premise of my 
analytical framework (Figure 1, section 4). However, the present debate shows no consensus 
on whether the effect of institutional embedding is positive or negative, nor any agreement on 
the mechanisms that link institutions to CSR performance.  
Beginning with the debate on the causal relationship between CSR and the institutional 
embedding of the economy, the disagreement concerns a “mirror effect” versus a “substitution 
effect.” Matten and Moon (2008) were among the first to theorize systematically on this issue. 
They argue that CSR is more prevalent in liberal market economies because it functions as a 
substitute for more institutionalized or regulated forms of corporate responsibility. The 
authors therefore claim that government, business and civil society actors in liberal market 
economies will pursue CSR more actively to fill the “institutional void” caused by weak 
welfare states and weak corporatism. Likewise, Kinderman (2009) suggests that CSR in 
liberal market economies functions as a material and symbolic substitute for the 
institutionalized forms of social solidarity secured by representative organizations and public 
policy in strong welfare states. These authors illustrate their argument by pointing to the 
strong US tradition for corporate donations and community involvement (Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2005), as well as the prevalence of CSR reports and CSR communication in US 
companies (Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Matten & Moon, 2008 ).  
Matten and Moon (2008) contrast these “explicit” CSR practices to the European tradition of 
“implicit” CSR, whereby corporate responsibilities tend to be regulated through state or 
corporatist systems, leaving less scope and incentive for companies to engage in voluntary 
initiatives like CSR. Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) reach much the same conclusion in 
their study of national variation in CSR performance scores in the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index (DJSI). They argue their empirical material supports the “substitution argument” 
because they find that companies from liberal market economies have higher average CSR 
scores in the different measures that constitute the DJSI. Based on similar empirical material, 
Moon and Kang reach the same conclusion: that CSR has a complimentary or compensating 
role in neo-liberal economies. They explain the recent increase in “explicit” CSR practices in 
coordinated and mixed market economies by citing these economies’ transformation towards 
increasing reliance on market solutions and their embracing of shareholder capitalism (Moon 
and Kang 2010). In other words, a movement towards a liberal market economy causes the 
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observed increase in “explicit” CSR practices. Thus, according to the “substitution argument,” 
weaker institutions for embedding the economy lead to stronger CSR practices.  
There are, however, strong reasons to expect the exact opposite effect: a “mirror effect” 
whereby strong institutions for social embedding of the economy “force” companies to adhere 
to higher social and environmental standards, thereby providing companies, governments and 
civil society actors with a stronger base from which to pursue CSR. As Crouch (2006) claims, 
CSR is essentially about firms taking responsibility for their negative externalities. Strong 
institutions for embedding the economy will consequently have a stronger ability to hold 
companies accountable in this respect. Campbell (2007) provides the most systematic 
theoretical argument for this “mirror argument,” claiming that strong state regulation, 
collective bargaining, and strong institutionalized norms regarding appropriate corporate 
behavior will encourage/demand socially responsible behavior in companies, and hence 
objectively increase the level of social and environmental standards in corporate practices. 
This argument is also supported by empirical studies. For instance, Birkin et al. (2009) and 
McCall and Webb (2004) relate the strong Nordic position in CSR to these countries’ 
advanced welfare-state policies. Midttun et al. (2006) also find that performance in CSR – a 
new way of embedding companies – tends to mirror the old way of embedding companies, 
namely that countries with high scores on state regulation, corporatism and coordination tend 
to be over-represented in CSR initiatives.  
To conclude, both a positive and a negative causal effect going from institutional embedding 
to CSR performance can plausibly be argued empirically and theoretically based on current 
literature. However, both arguments obviously cannot be true at the same time.  
In my opinion, the “substitution argument” has its merits, theoretically and empirically, in 
explaining the sequencing, that is, why the practice and discourse of CSR emerged much 
earlier in the United States and gained speed first in the Anglo-American/liberal market 
economies. For instance, Kinderman (2009, 2011) points to the much earlier establishment of 
national CSR organizations in liberal economies than in coordinated market economies. Thus, 
the substitution argument seems valid for temporal explanations regarding the rise and spread 
of CSR.  
The empirical studies that supports the “substitution argument” based on analysis of present 
practices in CSR, however, contain in my opinion a serious methodological flaw; They do not 
55
  
correct for the size of the economies of the different countries included in their studies. For 
instance, Apostulakou and Jackson (2010) use scores on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
to prove their argument. In essence, they base their argument on the fact that companies from 
liberal market economies have higher average CSR scores in the DJSI compared to the scores 
of companies from coordinated market economies. Based on the somewhat higher average 
scores of companies from liberal market economies, they conclude that these economies’ have 
stronger CSR practices. However, they draw their conclusions based on comparison of the 
average index scores from companies originating in vastly different economies in terms of 
size. I argue that the absolute numbers in the index provides for a much more relevant 
comparison. The absolute numbers, corrected for the size of the economies, convey a 
completely different story: For instance, if one compares the absolute number of US 
companies in the DJSI index to the absolute number of Nordic companies in the DJSI, one 
finds that 58 US companies and 18 Nordic companies have managed to qualify for the DJSI. 
Given that the US economy is almost 12 times bigger than the combined Nordic economies, 
these 18 Nordic companies represent a significant achievement: the US economy would need 
216 companies in the DJSI to match the Nordic economies performance in the DJSI. In my 
opinion, this achievement outwheighs the Nordic companies somewhat lower CSR scores 
within the index aggregates. Moreover, I argue that this kind of comparison, which 
incorporates the size of the companies home economies in the analysis, generates more 
relevant findings compared to analyses of average national CSR scores within DJSI. To 
conclude, correcting for the size of the economies is essential in such comparisons, and doing 
so removes the empirical support for the “substitution argument,” as demonstrated by Articles 
1 and 2.  
The analytical framework of the thesis was conceived several years before this debate 
emerged in international journals. The debate that I sought to address was the discussion of 
whether political-economic institutions influence CSR practices in any discernible way. My 
initial ambition was therefore to investigate whether the political-economic background of the 
firms could explain cross-national variation in CSR performance. To study this, I derived an 
alternative hypothesis from IPE, which posits that susceptibility to anti-globalisation/activist 
pressures is the main reason why companies engage in CSR. Aggregated to the national level, 
it means that cross-national variation in CSR practices is more likely to be caused by 
variations in the proportion of globally oriented companies in the individual nations.  My 
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“null-hypothesis” is therefore not the “substitution hypothesis” but the “globalist hypothesis” 
– that CSR performance will reflect the aggregate proportion of globally oriented companies 
in each nation. 
My conclusions in Article 2 end up firmly supporting the “mirror argument” – that strong 
institutional embedding of the economy leads to increased CSR. This argument appears to 
provide a robust explanation of cross-national variation in CSR performance in the QCA 
analysis. The mirror argument is further strengthened by the fact that many of the Nordic 
“pioneers” in CSR point to the importance of political-economic factors for their success in 
CSR (Article 4). Unfortunately, the substitution argument had not yet surfaced in the literature 
at the time of writing, and I therefore did not explore this argument directly as an alternative 
hypothesis in Article 2. In this respect, the high index score of the UK, and relatively high 
score of Canada, could attest to the validity of the substitution argument, as these are both 
liberal market economies. However, the rock bottom index scores of the United States – 
which should be the prime location for a substitution effect – do seem to severely weaken the 
substitution argument. Moreover, the large variation in CSR within the group of liberal market 
economies further weakes the argument, and I therefore conclude that my findings do not 
support the substitution argument. Instead, the QCA analysis indicates that the nations’ 
proportion of globally oriented companies, not the weak embedding of their nations’ 
economies, is a better overall explanation for the individual scores of the liberal market 
economies’ in the index of CSR performance: The proportion of globally oriented companies 
in a country’s economy is a strong predictor for that country’s score on the index, which 
explains both the high scores of the UK and Canada and the low scores of the United States. 
This finding indicates that factors related to the dynamics of globalization should not be 
ignored in comparative analyses of CSR. The explanatory power of the “globalist hypothesis” 
in the QCA analysis should therefore caution us not to overestimate the role of institutions in 
explaining CSR: As outlined by IPE, CSR is largely a corporate response to new challenges 
presented by economic globalization; therefore, global and transnational explanations of CSR 
practices seem a necessary complement to institutional explanations.   
From a methodological viewpoint, the findings indicate causal complexity in the sense that 
different combinations of the explanatory factors are necessary to fully explain the observed 
outcomes. Different combinations of causal factors explain different subsets of outcomes, and 
doing so according to different logics. Quantitative comparative studies can therefore get us 
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only so far, and qualitative case studies are necessary to understand the mechanisms and 
processes at work behind the aggregate scores. These mechansisms and processes are the 
focus of the two last research questions.  
7.2. The political economy of CSR – convergence or divergence? 
Assessing the influence of political-economic institutions on CSR requires an understanding 
of the political-economic model underlying CSR itself. Therefore, in the second research 
question I asked, “To what extent is CSR predicated on a neo-liberal political-economic 
model of business-society relations, and which conflicts arise with the introduction of CSR in 
social-democratic societies?" My findings in Articles 3 and 4 indicate that CSR implies a neo-
liberal political economy, which at times is far from compatible with social-democratic 
traditions.  
CSR is spreading rapidly across the globe, not only as a business concept, but also as part of 
public policy. However, as outlined in Section 2.1, the mainstream CSR literature shows little 
interest in the political dimensions of CSR, and while IPE authors portray CSR as a highly 
political project, their analyses tend to focus on international or transnational politics. My aim 
was therefore to analyze how CSR is adopted, conceptualized and implemented in a national 
political context, and on this basis also derive some insights regarding the political-economic 
model implied by CSR. In particular, I wanted to see whether the neo-liberal heritage of CSR 
causes conflicts when actors in the social-democratic Nordic countries adopt and interpret 
CSR.  
Regarding the first part of the question, I argue that the political economy of CSR is closely 
affiliated with the neo-liberal model in that CSR promotes business and civil society as the 
main actors in securing responsible corporate practices. CSR is traditionally industry-driven 
and delegates key welfare issues to business discretion, relying strongly on voluntary business 
initiatives and market-related policy instruments. In contrast, social-democratic welfare states 
are known for strong governmental engagement in social and environmental policy issues, 
intentionally limiting corporate discretion through public regulation and corporatist 
agreements. Especially the role assigned to labor unions differs fundamentally between the 
the social-democratic model and the model implied by CSR. CSR defines labor unions as 
“stakeholders” on par with NGOs, local communities and other social groups. This stands in 
stark contrast to the extensive rights and privileges labor unions enjoy within the corporatist 
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system – a system that still has strong public support in social-democratic countries. 
Consequently, CSR stakeholdership is not related to either numerical democracy, traditional 
political bargaining or corporatist structures – the pillars of the Nordic political-economic 
system. Thus, CSR draws the boundaries between state, market, and civil society in a 
fundamentally different way than does the social-democratic model. Against this background, 
the political economy implied by CSR appears antithetical to social democratic traditions. 
Turning now to the question of the conflicts that might arise when CSR is introduced in 
social-democratic countries, my findings indicate that CSR causes conflicts over means rather 
than conflict over goals. As expected, the Nordic governments enthusiastically embrace the 
goals of CSR, eagerly promoting and supporting CSR, often using CSR quite speculatively to 
strengthen pre-existing welfare state policies. However, aligning CSR with social-democratic 
traditions involves considerable conflict: At the level of means CSR differ starkly from the 
social-democratic tradition, and the majority of the Nordic actors show widespread skepticism 
towards relying on CSR and towards the effectiveness of voluntary initiatives generally.  
My findings regarding these conflicts also provide a new angle for studying more 
theoretically the influence of political-economic institutions on CSR. The analysis of how 
CSR is adoptied in the Nordic societies, sheds light on a core point of disagreement between 
new-institutional theory and CPE: Will CSR cause global convergence in organizational 
practices because of its legitimizing power and global organizational field, as proposed by 
new-institutional theory? Or will there be continued cross-national divergence in CSR 
practices, because CSR infringes on fundamental political-economic institutions, as proposed 
by CPE?  
Contrary to the expectations from CPE theory, the Nordic governments to ignore CSR as a 
public-policy issue. Nor do the governments only adopt CSR ceremoniously, using “de-
coupling” and “double talk” to allow them to continue their internal practices unchanged, as 
predicted by traditional new-institutional theory. Instead, my findings indicate that the Nordic 
actors rather creatively solve the inherent conflicts between the neo-liberal CSR tradition and 
the Nordic, social democratic traditions, in a way that allows for an active adoption of CSR 
while still accomodating Nordic institutional imperatives: Rather than dismissing CSR, the 
Nordic governments actively adapt, translate and edit CSR to accommodate their social-
democratic welfare-state traditions in a way that reduces or redirects potential conflicts. The 
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Nordic governments seem to resolve the conflict between CSR and social-democratic 
traditions through three main accommodating strategies: First, governments externalize 
potential conflicts by confining CSR policies to companies operating in non-domestic and 
non-Nordic markets. Second, governments compartmentalize CSR by confining their CSR 
initiatives to fields less amenable to traditional regulation, mainly competitiveness and 
innovation policy. Third, governments limit CSR to policies to supplement welfare-state 
functions, but only in times of obvious welfare-state limitations.6 Often, this active adaptation 
of CSR to a social-democratic reality leads to a quite radical change from the initial neo-
liberal origins of CSR, to the extent that CSR even acquired a “leftist stamp” in Sweden. 
Thus, I find that CSR causes convergence in the sense that Nordic governments, business 
associations, labor unions and NGOs have all engaged with CSR and all use the language of 
CSR. However, my findings also confirms continued divergence caused by political-
economic institutions; The social-democratic norms of a strong embedding of the economy 
must be accommodated in the actors’ CSR practices, resulting in a specific “Nordic variety of 
CSR” that is recognized by interviewees across government, labor unions, business 
associations and NGOs. 
This process of convergence-cum-divergence – of local adaptation of a global concept – 
conforms to the expectations from “Scandinavian institutionalism” outlined in Section 3.4. In 
this respect, my analysis parallel analyses of other governments’ CSR policies. For example, 
Albareda et al. (2007) found that the Italian public policies for CSR were strongly integrated 
with regional industrial policies, thereby linking CSR to the long-standing Italian policy 
tradition of active support for regional industrial districts. Furthermore, the Nordic adaptation 
of CSR has clear parallels to the Nordic adaptation of another neo-liberal, but much more 
studied concept, namely New Public Management (NPM). NPM is also documented as being 
extensively transformed when implemented in Norway and Sweden, because it is alleged to 
have a “low cultural compatibility” (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). Consequently, political-
economic institutions do influence the perception of CSR in a way that forces the actors to 
adapt, and at times, even to radically transform the content and meaning of CSR in order to 
make CSR compatible with their institutional traditions.  
                                                 
6 These three strategies are further expanded on in Midttun, Gjølberg et al. (forthcoming 2012).  
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Returning to the debate on CSR as a “mirror” versus a “substitute” for strong welfare states, 
the widespread adoption of CSR in Nordic public policy clearly supports the mirror argument: 
The strong Nordic institutions for social embedding seem to provide a solid foundation for 
public engagement in CSR. This finding contrasts the “substitution argument,” which predicts 
advanced welfare states to have little need for or interest in CSR as a public-policy tool 
essentially because CSR functions as an alternative to welfare-state regulation. Matten and 
Moon (2008)  and Kinderman (2011) therefore expect to find explicit government 
engagement in CSR primarily in liberal market economies, while they expect it to remain 
implicit in social-democratic welfare states like the Nordics – embedded in state regulation 
and corporatist agreements.  
The interpretation of my findings in relation to the “substitution” versus the “mirror” 
argument is, however, somewhat ambiguous. In one sense, my findings counter the 
substitution argument: The governments’ active use of the tripartite system in their CSR 
initiatives indicates that Nordic CSR practices reinforce existing political-economic traditions, 
rather than substitute them. Moreover, the actors clearly do not see CSR as a legitimate 
substitute for the welfare state, and interviewees across the Nordic countries stress that CSR is 
only a “second-best” policy option. Nevertheless, my findings indirectly confirms the validity 
and relevance of the substitution argument: The actors clearly fear that CSR will become a 
substitute to welfare-state or corporatist methods to regulate corporate responsibilities, and 
consequently see that CSR can come at the expense of “The Nordic Model.” Thus, my 
findings attest to the existence, or at the very least to the perception, of the zero-sum 
relationship between CSR and strong institutions for embedding the economy, as implied by 
the substitution argument. 
This CPE discussion of a “substitution effect” of CSR in national governance is paralleled in 
the IPE discussion of the “undermining effect” of CSR in global governance. My findings 
relate directly the IPE claim that CSR runs the risk of undermining mandatory approaches to 
corporate responsibility, such as state regulation or corporatist agreements. My interviewees’ 
skepticism towards CSR is indeed founded on their fear of a win-lose situation whereby 
voluntary approaches like CSR undermine mandatory approaches to corporate responsibility. 
However, my analysis of the regulatory preferences of the Nordic actors reveals a dynamic 
between CSR and regulation that is more complex than implied by the 
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substitution/undermining argument in CPE/IPE literature. This dynamic is the topic of the last 
research question.  
7.3. CSR and regulation – undermining or underpinning?  
In the final research question I ask, “How does CSR relate to soft law and hard law, and under 
which conditions will the actors favor mandatory versus voluntary approaches to corporate 
responsibility?” The analysis concerning this question produced several findings that 
fundamentally counter theoretical expectations, indicating a need to revisit existing theories 
on the relationship between voluntary and mandatory approaches to corporate responsibility.  
Whereas the previous two research questions focused on causes of CSR, this question gives 
more insights into the consequences of CSR. From a political science perspective, the perhaps 
most intriguing aspect of CSR is its influence on soft and hard law processes. However, there 
is no consensus on the relationship between CSR, soft law, and hard law, and there is sparse 
theorizing on the mechanisms that link voluntary and mandatory approaches in social and 
environmental governance. My findings document that CSR is far from being an isolated 
business initiative devoid of political implications – it is fundamentally intertwined with 
political and regulatory processes. Explaining the actors’ regulatory preferences, therefore, 
requires understanding the political-economic, institutional context of the actors.  
The relation between CSR and regulation – or between voluntary and mandatory approaches – 
has two dimensions: the effect of regulation on CSR, and the effect of CSR on regulation. 
Beginning with the first, the QCA analysis in Article 2 documents a positive causal 
relationship between regulation and CSR; companies from countries with strong state and 
corporatist regulation of business all score highly on the CSR performance index. Thus, 
strong regulation seems to strengthen corporate CSR practices. The qualitative Nordic case 
studies in Articles 3 and 4 further strengthen this finding: All actors across the governments, 
trade unions, NGOs and business clearly believe that strict state regulation and binding 
corporatist agreements is an important factor in explaing the Nordic success in CSR.  
The reverse question – the effect of CSR on regulation – is far more complex. The academic 
debate is divided between two arguments: One argument holding that CSR has an 
“undermining effect” on regulations, and one argument holding that CSR has an 
“underpinning effect” on regulation. The majority of IPE authors seem to favor the first 
argument. They claim that CSR can undermine or supplant mandatory regulation by 
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overemphasizing the achievements of CSR initiatives and thereby creating an exaggerated 
belief in voluntary approaches. According to these authors, improvements in corporate 
practices are historically associated with regulation, tripartite agreements and pressure from 
civil society. Moreover, they claim that it is precisely these driver that CSR undermines: By 
engaging NGOs in CSR partnerships, side-stepping labor unions and improving practices 
sufficiently to stave off severe criticism and ensuing demands for hard law, CSR may 
undermine key drivers for regulations, intentionally or unintentionally.  
The majority of my interviewees seem to share this concern that CSR will undermine legal or 
corporatist approaches to corporate responsibility. The Nordic governments in particular seem 
acutely aware of CSR’s potential to undermine or at least conflict with Nordic traditions. 
Article 3 documents how the Nordic governments’ enthusiasm for CSR is limited to policy 
areas that do not lend themselves well to traditional government regulation or corporatist 
agreements. They clearly state that  CSR is a “second best” policy option that should not 
come at the expense of hard law or corporatist agreements. In parallel to their governments, 
the Nordic companies seem just as concerned about the “undermining” scenario, and appear 
even more adamant that CSR is no substitute for regulation; 81 percent do not agree to the 
statement that “CSR can replace public policy”, and 78 percent encourage their governments 
to work for stricter social and environmental regulation internationally. 
However, while the governments clearly recognize and fear the undermining potential of 
CSR, they also see CSR as a potential stepping stone that can underpin future mandatory 
regulation if used correctly. This argument of CSR as having an “underpinning” effect on 
regulation, refers to the concept of  a “juridification” of CSR, whereby governments use CSR 
initiatives as a basis for developing both soft and hard law (Buhman 2010). Furthermore, 
some authors argue that CSR initiatives spur cognitive, discursive, and normative changes 
that might qualitatively strengthen national and global governance, reaching far beyond the 
companies that take part in the initiative (Pattberg, 2006). These studies propose that CSR can 
be a new source of stricter global governance, whereby CSR paves the way for, or actively 
reinforces, hard law processes, thereby underpinning rather than undermining hard law 
(Abbott and Snidal,  2000; Haufler,  2001; Kirton and Trebilock, 2004).  
The government actors seem the most optimistic regarding CSR’s potential to underpin hard 
law processes, and some of their enthusiasm towards CSR lies in its potential as a stepping 
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stone towards legal codification. The choice of CSR initiatives in Nordic public policies 
illustrates this dynamic, because the governments seem particularly eager to support those 
CSR initiatives that have the highest “juridification” potential, like the Extractive Industries’ 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises, and the 
UN Norms on Business and Human Rights. These are all initiatives with strong involvement 
from multi-lateral institutions, which can serve as a stepping stone towards international 
regime formation. In parallel, the governments strive to codify CSR in domestic law. For 
instance, three for the Nordic governments have now made previously voluntary CSR 
reporting a legal requirement for certain categories of companies, thereby reflecting a rather 
legalistic approach to corporate responsibilities.  
To conclude, my findings lend support both to the argument concerning CSR’s potential to 
undermine regulation and to the argument concerning its potential to underpin regulation, but 
not necessarily as expected by theory. My main finding is a strong preference for regulation, 
paralleled by a surprisingly strong skepticism towards CSR and voluntary approaches to 
corporate responsibility among both government and business actors. However, the basis for 
the strong preference differs across the actors, as do the underlying logics of their reasoning. 
This brings us to the question concerning the conditions under which companies will favor 
mandatory over voluntary regulation.  
Article 4 uncovers a strong pro-regulation position among Nordic businesses. This finding 
stands in stark contrast to the “undermining argument” of the IPE literature, which claims that 
business use CSR to pre-empt regulation, as proposed by Utting and Marques (2009), Levy 
and Kaplan (2008) and Clapp and Utting (2008). This literature predicts corporate resistance 
to regulations, because regulations are expected to increase the cost of business and to limit 
corporate freedoms. Pro-regulation attitudes in business are only expected in clean-tech 
companies or social enterprises with a direct, firm-specific interest in stricter regulations. My 
findings do not support this expectation of regulatory resistance: Contrary to expectations, the 
survey of Nordic pioneers in CSR – which is dominated by mainstream, traditional companies 
– reveals a surprisingly strong preference for hard law and a rather paradoxical skepticism 
towards CSR. While the survey is not representative of Nordic companies in general, it 
clearly indicates that these pioneering companies – which have undertaken the highest 
investment in CSR – have not done so to undermine or pre-empt hard law processes: 78 
percent of the companies welcome binding international regulation, and 81 percent disagree 
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that CSR should replace public policy. However, being companies with high CSR 
performance, this pro-regulation position makes perfect business sense; over 80 percent of the 
companies maintain that stricter social and environmental regulation would increase their 
competitiveness. As pioneers in CSR, the logical strategy for these companies is to encourage 
binding regulation of CSR issues: they most likely already comply with conceivable future 
regulatory requirements, and regulations would therefore directly strengthens their 
competitive advantage. 
A pro-regulation position among companies is hardly a surprising finding when regulations 
would level the playing field to the companies’ advantage. The interesting findings are, first, 
that this regulatory support is found among mainstream, dominant companies from traditional 
industries, and second, that the companies point to domestic, political-economic institutions 
as the source of their high social and environmental standards. Thus, “comparative 
institutional advantage” (Hall and Soskice 2001) seems a crucial concept to explain how a 
strong institutional embedding of the economy can serve as a source for stronger CSR 
performance, and subsequently condition the actors’ regulatory preferences. Moreover, the 
majority of the survey respondents seem to think this institutional advantage in CSR extends 
to the their domestic economies in general, claiming that, “the average Nordic company has 
higher social and environmental standards than companies from other countries.” Thus, the 
Nordic political-economic institutions as a whole seem an important factor to explain the 
Nordic companies high CSR performance and their strong preference for regulation. 
In terms of the underlying mechanisms that link CSR to regulatory preferences, the actors 
reflect widely diverging logics. Government interviewees often invoke normative 
justifications for their pro-regulation position, frequently referring to Nordic norms, traditions 
and values in line with a “logic of appropriateness.” Oftentimes, they simply refer to “The 
Nordic Model,”7 as if this is stating the obvious with no need for further explanation. In 
contrast, the companies’ preference for hard law seems mainly guided by a “logic of 
consequences,” as discussed above. Nevertheless, the importance of national, structural-
regulative institutions seems to be amplified by a perhaps equally important effect of 
normative-cognitive institutions as emphasized by new-institutionalism: The respondents 
explicitly point to the importance of Nordic values and traditions in forming their approach to 
CSR. Correspondingly, comparative studies of Nordic and US business managers indicate 
                                                 
7 Alternatively the Danish/Finnish/Swedish/Norwegian Model 
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that, ceteris paribus, the Nordic managers are more positively inclined towards regulation 
(Lindell & Karagozoglu, 2001). This finding indicates that normative-cognitive effects of the 
institutional environments also influence regulatory preferences of business actors, and that a 
“logic of appropriateness” is a central component to understand the corporate positions in the 
debate over voluntary versus regulatory approaches to corporate responsibility.  
To conclude, the question of whether CSR will undermine or underpin hard law is far more 
complex than portrayed by the dominant theories of corporate political strategies: IPE theories 
emphasize transnational or global factors, and mainstream business theories focus on firm- or 
industry-specific factors – both leading to the assumption that dominant companies will resist 
increased regulation and instead support voluntary approaches like CSR. My findings 
document the exact opposite. Thus, IPE and business theories seem able to explain neither the 
strong support for regulation nor the skepticism toward CSR found among Nordic pioneers in 
CSR. In contrast to these theories’ emphasis on globalisation, and firm- or industry-specific 
characteristics, my material points to the importance the entire national, political-economic 
institutional environment of the firms in explaining the actors’ practices and preferences. 
Consequently, my findings indicate a need to nuance the dominant theories of corporate 
political strategy: Regulatory preferences must be analyzed within a framework that takes 
account of both the structural-regulatory aspects and the normative-cognitive aspects of 
political-economic institutions.  
However, the most troubling conclusion regarding the Nordic companies’ strong skepticism 
towards CSR and voluntary approaches, is that even though these companies are global 
leaders in terms of advanced CSR practices, a large majority of them believe that CSR is 
neither effective, or nor sufficient to improve corporate practices. Moreover, the companies’ 
CSR engagement does not seem to be the source of their strong social and environmental 
performance. In fact, none of the respondents indicate that CSR activities have caused their 
high social and environmental standards. Instead, they point to regulation, corporatist 
agreements and strong normative expectations in their home markets as the main cause. Thus, 
the primary source of the companies’ high social and environmental standards is the Nordic 
structural-regulative and normative-cognitive institutions, not their efforts in CSR initiatives. 
Why then, do the companies engage in CSR activities, if they do not believe that CSR is 
effective for improving social and environmental practices? My findings indicate that they 
instead believe that CSR is effective for improving public relations, as illustrated by the 
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companies’ listing “reputation and brand” as their number one motive to engage in CSR, and 
by the fact the CSR unit is most frequently placed under the companies’ PR or 
Communications departments. Thus, the causal relationship between strong engagement in 
CSR and high social and environmental standards, seems to be spurious. My findings rather 
indicate a reverse causality: high social and environmental standards cause the companies to 
engage in CSR to communicate their social and environmental excellence more effectively to 
the public.  
7.4. Conclusion: practical and theoretical relevance of the dissertation 
Finding that political-economic institutions significantly influence CSR practices has 
fundamental implications for our understanding of CSR both as a management tool and as a 
political phenomenon.  
First, from a business perspective, this finding has practical implications for the business case 
of CSR. If political economic institutions in the companies’ environment significantly 
influence their CSR practice and performance, the prospect of a business case for CSR is not 
uniform: Companies from some nations are more likely to succeed in their CSR efforts, and 
thus more likely to reap the benefits of CSR – increased profits, employee satisfaction, 
improved investor relations, etc. Consequently, the claim of a general “business case for 
CSR” must be moderated, because companies from some political-economic systems have 
stronger incentives to engage in CSR  
Second, from a public policy perspective, the finding has implications for the “government 
case for CSR”: If CSR practices are closely linked to fundamental political-economic 
institutions and processes, it becomes crucial to understand how CSR interfaces with policy 
traditions. CSR has become a popular concept with governments, and most advanced, 
industrialized nations now have public policies to promote CSR and uses CSR to enlist the 
resources of business to achieve social and environmental policy goals. If CSR has strong 
links to political-economic institutions, the process of introducing CSR in public policy may 
be more complex and problematic than often assumed. As outlined above, CSR is predicated 
on a neo-liberal model of state–market–civil society relations, a model that might conflict 
with alternative models concerning the role of business in society. In this sense, CSR must be 
understood as an arena for political negotiation and contestation, in which actors engage in the 
debate over CSR based on vested interests and political ideology, trying to influence the 
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outcome of public policy. If so, CSR is not just a business management tool, but also a 
political project that requires a deeper understanding of power, ideology and vested interest in 
national politics.  
Third, from a global governance perspective, recognizing the political nature of CSR also has 
implications for our understanding of how CSR interfaces with global governance and with 
attempts to regulate corporate social and environmental conduct in the global economy. If 
CSR is intertwined with political-economic institutions and processes, the debate over 
mandatory versus voluntary approaches to influence business practices needs to be informed 
by an understanding of the institutional antecedents of CSR. Advocates of CSR present CSR 
as an instrument to improve social and environmental governance: Voluntary initiatives, self-
regulation, private standard setting and civil regulation are often argued to be more feasible 
and effective in comparison to international regulations and regimes. However, understanding 
the institutional antecedents and preconditions for corporate support for CSR casts new light 
on the complexity of regulatory preferences. Thus, understanding how political-economic 
institutions influence corporate and government perceptions of CSR informs us of the 
dynamic between CSR, soft law, and hard law, and of the conditions under which firms and 
governments will favor mandatory over voluntary approaches to corporate responsibility.  
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Introduction 
 
The global community faces social and environmental challenges on an 
unprecedented scale, creating a pressing need for effective global governance. 
Business is a key actor both in the creation and in the solution of social and 
environmental problems. On one hand, business is criticized for causing social 
and environmental damage in a reckless pursuit of profits1 while obstructing 
attempts to establish legal frameworks to govern the global economy.2 On the 
other hand, the popularity of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) demonstrates 
a shift in norms, one in which business increasingly accepts responsibility for its 
social and environmental impact, and changes its practices on a voluntary basis.3 
Thus, in the absence of hard laws4 and legal frameworks to govern the global 
economy, CSR emerges as an alternative approach to global governance, based on 
self-regulation and soft law5 mechanisms. 
CSR is contested in both public and academic debate.6 Critics question the 
effectiveness of CSR in improving corporate practices; due to CSR’s voluntary, 
market-driven nature, CSR initiatives can induce only incremental changes, as 
they are inherently limited to situations with a win-win relationship between CSR 
and corporate profits. Thus, no matter how well intended and executed, CSR 
initiatives appear inherently unable to address more systemic unsustainabilities in 
the global economy.7 Critics therefore claim that binding regulations are needed to 
improve the social and environmental practices of the majority of companies. 
In general, there is limited knowledge of how CSR, soft law, and hard law 
are linked, and there is no consensus as to whether CSR has a negative, neutral or 
positive impact on efforts to create hard law. Business and management 
disciplines tend to focus on the financial and operational aspects of CSR, and 
devote less attention to its wider governance implications. Social scientists tend to 
adopt a rather skeptical stance towards CSR, claiming that irrespective of its 
ability to improve social and environmental practices at the company level, CSR 
can supplant or undermine efforts to create hard law. By overemphasizing the 
achievements of CSR and the potential for win-win situations, CSR proponents 

1 Bakan 2004. 
2 Utting 2000. 
3 Vogel 2009. 
4 Hard law is defined as “a regime relying primarily on the authority and power of the state (…) in 
the construction, operation, and implementation, including enforcement, of arrangements at the 
international, national or subnational level” (Kirton and Trebilock 2004, 9).  
5 Soft law is defined as “regimes that rely primarily on the participation and resources of 
nongovernmental actors in the construction, operation and implementation of a governance 
arrangement” (Kirton and Trebilock 2004,  9). 
6 See Crane et al 2008 for an overview.
7 Mayer and Gereffi 2010; Utting and Marques 2009; Vogel 2005. 
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can, according to these skeptics, create an exaggerated belief in voluntary 
approaches, thereby weakening the legitimacy of demands for regulations put 
forth by NGOs, labor unions and activists. Some critics even claim that CSR is a 
deliberate corporate strategy to pre-empt regulation. By sufficiently improving 
corporate practices to deflect criticism, by diverting public scrutiny, by co-opting 
NGOs and marginalizing labor unions, CSR and soft law initiatives can actively 
weaken key drivers for hard law, according to these critics.8 However, other 
studies indicate that CSR can be a potential new source of improved global 
governance, claiming that CSR and soft law initiatives can in some instances pave 
the way for, and actively reinforce, hard law processes, thereby underpinning 
rather than undermining hard law.9  
This article aims to explore the relationship between CSR, soft law, and 
hard law, and to analyze under which conditions companies actively support 
increased environmental and social regulation. While the majority of evidence in 
the current debate centers on companies from the United States or from major EU 
economies, this article provides a Nordic perspective by exploring the attitudes 
and perceptions of Nordic leaders in CSR. The Nordic area is reputed to be at the 
forefront both of CSR and of social and environmental legislation, and might 
offer a different perspective on the dynamics between CSR and regulation. The 
empirical analysis, based on a survey of the Nordic companies with the highest 
scores on CSR performance, reveals a strong preference for hard law, and a rather 
paradoxical skepticism towards CSR: 78 percent of the companies welcome 
binding international regulation, 70 percent see voluntary initiatives as 
insufficient to improve corporate performance, and 81 percent disagree that CSR 
can replace public policy. This strong preference for regulation counters neo-
liberal theory, which predicts resistance to increased regulation and government 
intervention. Moreover, the companies’ explicit skepticism towards voluntary 
initiatives appears somewhat antithetical to the ethos and rhetoric of CSR, which 
emphasize voluntarism. 
The article proceeds as follows: The next provides a literature review of 
CSR in the governance debate, and the third section outlines the methodology. 
The fourth section relates the main findings of the survey regarding Nordic 
companies’ perceptions of the role of governments and their perspectives on 
voluntary versus mandatory regulation of corporate responsibilities. The fifth 
section explores two possible explanations for the regulatory preferences 
uncovered, while section six provides a summary and concluding discussion of 
the implications of the analysis. 

8 Levy 1997; Riechter 2002; Utting 2000. 
9 Abbott and Snidal 2000; Haufler 2001; Kirton and Trebilock 2004.
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CSR in Global Governance 
 
The governance gap and regulatory failure associated with economic 
globalization are well discussed in the literature.10 This inability of governments 
to hold corporations accountable through democratic institutions and processes 
led to increasing public discontent in the 1990s. As civil society organizations 
became increasingly frustrated with corporate unaccountability and governmental 
inaction, they began to bypass the political level by targeting corporations 
directly. Through “naming and shaming,” boycotts, demonstrations and 
confrontational tactics, NGOs managed to attack corporate brands, legitimacy, 
and in some instances corporate profits. 
CSR emerged as a corporate response to these civil society pressures. 
While the term “CSR” appeared as early as the 1950s,11 its present form is closely 
linked to the anti-globalization movement beginning in the 1990s.12 CSR is most 
commonly defined as going “beyond compliance,” that is, practices where 
companies voluntarily improve their social and environmental performance.13 
Furthermore, CSR is understood to be “beyond charity,” as it concerns how 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns into their core business 
operations.14 
The debates on CSR and on global governance are becoming increasingly 
intertwined.15 In many instances, CSR initiatives simply consist of unilateral or ad 
hoc projects from single companies, such as developing a code of conduct, a CSR 
report, or specific projects to improve social and environmental practices in the 
company without any wider governance implications. However, several CSR 
initiatives have started out as or developed into soft law institutions with co-
regulation through multi-stakeholder participation and monitoring of compliance. 
These initiatives range from very loose soft law arrangements like the UN Global 
Compact, with weak compliance mechanisms, to more stringent initiatives, like 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Thus, the boundary between 
CSR initiatives and soft law is often blurred.16 Some of the soft law initiatives that 
originated out of the CSR movement, like the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), have even acquired hard law 
characteristics. These transitions between CSR, soft law and hard law, indicate 
that CSR is indeed relevant to the study of global governance and that the 

10 Ruggie 2003; Stiglitz 2003; Stopford and Strange 1991; Story 1999.  
11 Carroll 2008.  
12 Levy and Kaplan 2008.  
13 World Business Council for Susatinable Development (WBCSD) 2002.  
14 European Union 2001; Porter and Kramer 2006.  
15 Levy and Kaplan 2008.  
16 Hirschland 2006; Vogel 2009.  
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relationship between the three is better described as a continuum rather than as a 
dichotomy.17 
 
The Role of CSR in the Development of Soft and Hard Law 
 
There is substantial literature, primarily within business studies, documenting 
how CSR can improve corporate social and environmental practices while also 
improving corporate profits.18 Critics, however, claim that CSR, being predicated 
on a market-driven logic, is inherently limited to these situations with a “business 
case” for CSR. Such win-win situations seem mainly to arise for companies with 
high-profile brands, companies operating in high-risk locations or industries, or in 
consumer-sensitive markets.19 Furthermore, due to its market-based, voluntary 
nature, CSR tends to induce only incremental changes that do not address 
structural unsustainabilies and governance deficits in the global economic 
system.20 As a case in point, one of the most studied and successful CSR 
initiatives, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification scheme, covers 
only 1.8 percent of total global forests, the majority being in the northern 
hemisphere where forest management practices are in relatively less need of 
improvement.21  
Thus, the literature indicates that, despite the successes of CSR, 
mandatory, hard law is necessary to affect the practices of the great majority of 
companies and to ensure minimum standards. From a sustainability perspective it 
then becomes crucial to understand the governance implications of CSR, in 
particular its effect on soft and hard law. Unfortunately, CSR theory within the 
business and management disciplines rarely discusses the role of corporations as 
political actors in global governance.22 From a political science viewpoint, 
however, CSR cannot be understood in isolation from the wider debate on power 
and global governance.23 As Levy and Kaplan24 argue, the weakness of the 
business case for CSR suggests that one should not underestimate the political 
motivations for companies to engage in CSR.  
The majority of social scientists writing about CSR tend to be skeptical 
regarding the impact of CSR on global social and environmental governance. 
These authors emphasize that improvements in corporate practices historically are 

17 Kirton and Trebilock 2004. 
18 Bhattacharya, Sen, Korschum 2008; Elkington 1998; Jensen 2001; Kurucz, Colbert and 
Wheeler 2008; Porter and Kramer 2006.  
19 Margolis and Walsh 2003; Mayer and Gereffi 2010; Vogel 2005. 
20 Doane 2005.  
21 Pattberg 2006. 
22 Marcus, Kurucz and Colbert 2009; Scherer and Palazzo 2008; Vogel 2005.  
23 Blowfield 2005; Fuchs 2007; Moon and Vogel 2008; Newell 2000.  
24 Levy and Kaplan 2008.  
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associated with regulation, tripartite agreements, and pressure from civil society, 
and that precisely these drivers run the risk of being undermined by CSR: By 
engaging NGOs in dialogue and cooperation, often side-stepping labor unions, 
and improving practices sufficiently to stave off severe criticism and ensuing 
demands for hard law, CSR may in effect weaken key drivers for the development 
of binding regulations.25 For instance, German companies demand regulatory 
relief in direct exchange for greater efforts in CSR,26 illustrating how CSR might 
undermine hard law.27 Some critics go further, and claim that CSR is a deliberate 
corporate strategy to pre-empt and undermine regulation. Approaching CSR from 
a power perspective, these analyses portray CSR as an attempt to increase the 
discursive power of business in global governance.28 Thus, critics subscribe to a 
zero-sum or even negative-sum model where CSR supplants rather than 
supplements hard law. 
However, while rather silent on the issue of how CSR, soft law and hard 
law are actually linked, several studies document that there can be a positive-sum 
relationship between CSR and hard law. Some authors refer to an “emergent 
juridification” of CSR, whereby governments or intergovernmental organizations 
use CSR initiatives as a basis for developing both soft and hard law.29 For 
instance, the Swedish government requires all state-owned enterprises to report 
according to the GRI guidelines and the Danish government requires all major 
companies to report on CSR in their annual reports. Thus, CSR initiatives do in 
some instances pave the way for soft law, which in turn can develop into hard 
law. Such transitions from purely self-regulated CSR to soft law are seen as a 
promising avenue for improved social and environmental governance. In this 
respect, soft law has comparative advantages when it comes to establishing new 
governance regimes; it is less demanding, more flexible, and more feasible due to 
its legitimacy among governments, business, and NGOs. These characteristics 
make soft law easier to achieve as a first step towards improved governance, 
leaving it to hard law to create effective monitoring and enforcement over time.30 
Furthermore, CSR and soft law are argued to spur cognitive, discursive and 
normative changes which might have greater impact on governance than do the 
specific rules and standards set down by these initiatives.31 In addition, civil 
regulations and private social and environmental standards have the advantage, 
compared to domestic government regulations, of not being defined as a “barrier 

25 Utting 2000.  
26 Kinderman 2008.  
27 Kirton and Trebilock 2004; Schaffer and Pollack 2010.  
28 Fuchs 2007; Levy 1997; Riechter 2002. 
29 Buhman 2010.  
30 Abbott and Snidal 2000 and 2009; Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad 2006.  
31 Pattberg 2006.  
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to trade”  by the WTO agreements—a loophole in international trade law which 
civil regulation manages to exploit.32 However, the majority of authors see soft 
law mainly as a stepping-stone towards hard law. As summarized by Kirton and 
Trebilock: “It [soft law] is primarily valuable as a sometimes indispensable 
proving ground—a precursor and a useful intermediate step to hard law, or even a 
stimulus for it.”33  
 
Corporate Policy Preferences: CSR, Soft Law or Hard Law? 
 
While it is a commonly held view that business generally opposes regulation and 
has achieved widespread deregulation, the evidence points to a more complex 
picture of “regulatory flux” wherein “dramatic regulatory, deregulatory and re-
regulatory shifts are occurring simultaneously.”34 Levi-Faur35 even argues for a 
“regulatory explosion” in relation to global capitalism. In this respect, it is 
important to distinguish between regulation of business and regulation for 
business.36 The former refers to regulations that constrain corporate freedoms in 
the interest of the common good, such as restrictions on emissions or legal 
minimum standards for working conditions, while the latter refers to regulations 
that protect or promote business interests, such as property rights, contract laws or 
subsidies. Thus, business may be strongly in favor of increased regulation, both 
hard and soft, when it corresponds to corporate self-interest. Indeed, dominant 
companies or industries often use their political and economic leverage to achieve 
regulation that protects their competitive position, as illustrated by the classic case 
of corporate lobbying for the WTO adoption of the Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Rights, TRIPS.37 Thus, it is the regulatory content, rather than the form, 
which determines corporate support or resistance.   
However, regulations in the social and environmental domain often 
constitute regulation of business, which entails restrictions on corporate freedoms. 
Thus, the baseline assumption in most neo-liberalist, structuralist, and 
constructivist approaches is that business in general prefers maximum discretion 
in social and environmental governance. Minimal regulation is assumed to be the 
default position,38 and the literature abounds with examples of corporate 
resistance to regulation.39 Corporate lobbying against the UN Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the promotion of 

32 Vogel 2009.  
33 Kirton and Trebilock 2004, 27.  
34 Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 6.  
35 Levi-Faur 2005.  
36 Braithwaite and Drahos 2000. 
37 Sell 2003.
38 Abbott and Snidal 2009, 75. 
39 See for instance Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007; Mattli and Woods 2009; Vormedal 2010. 
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voluntary approaches by ICC40 and WBCSD41 are oft-cited examples of how 
corporations mobilize against anticipated regulations and use voluntary initiatives 
to accommodate criticism. “Responsible Care” and the “Code of Pharmaceutical 
Marketing Practices” are also argued to be examples of voluntary initiatives by 
global firms to forestall imminent threats of regulation.42 The result is a 
“regulatory capture” in which the regulation (or lack thereof) favors the interests 
of the regulated rather than the public interest and common good.43  
While the literature does document instances of corporate lobbying for 
increased social or environmental regulations by dominant industries or 
companies, closer inspection reveals that pro-regulation lobbying is the result of 
strategic corporate positioning in situations where companies perceive regulation 
to be highly likely or unavoidable.44 In these situations, expectations of 
regulations cause a tipping point at which a critical mass of companies shift their 
political strategies away from regulatory opposition and towards strategies for 
influencing regulatory design.45 One such example is the U.S. Climate Action 
Partnership (USCAP) where major corporate emitters started to lobby for strong 
domestic climate regulations in the United States at a time when such regulations 
were perceived as inevitable. This expectation of impending regulation rendered 
the previous anti-regulation approach politically untenable, and USCAP therefore 
lobbied forcefully for a market-based emissions trading scheme to forestall less 
attractive alternatives such as command and control- or tax-based regulations. 
Thus, the USCAP case does not reflect a corporate preference for stricter climate 
regulations per se, but rather a preference for the climate regulation that was 
considered the most business-friendly option.46  
In parallel, firms are assumed to favor CSR and weaker forms of soft law, 
preferably unilateral or industry-based self-regulation, instead of stronger forms 
of soft law, such as co-regulation or civil regulation in which NGOs, labor unions, 
and governments participate in regulatory design and implementation.47 These 
regulatory preferences are illustrated in the case of the forest industry, where 
industry associations have created competing, business-friendly certification 

40International Chamber of Commerce. 
41 World Business Council for Sustainable Development.  
42 Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Newell 2005; Rowlands 2001.  
43 Mattli and Woods 2009; Posner 1974. 
44 Companies that stand to benefit directly from stricter standards, for instance clean-tech 
companies, will also have incentives to lobby for stricter regulations, but this class of companies is 
often not powerful enough to create regulatory momentum.   
45 Vormedal 2010.
46Meckling 2008.
47 Levy and Kaplan 2008; Ruggie 2003; Vogel 2005 and 2009. 
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schemes in response to the Forest Stewardship Council certification, which has 
stricter standards enforced through co-regulation.48  
Thus, the order of business preferences in social and environmental 
governance is assumed to be no regulation, followed by soft law, with a 
preference for weaker forms such as unilateral and industry-based self-regulation 
rather than co-regulation. Finally, hard law is considered the least desired option. 
NGOs, labor unions and progressive governments, on the other hand, are seen as 
the driving forces for establishing soft law, and for converting soft law into hard 
law.49 However, the findings in the following analysis challenge this picture, as a 
clear majority of the companies strongly favors increased international social and 
environmental regulation. This preference for increased regulation has important 
implications for our understanding of the potential governance effects of CSR and 
provides a new perspective on the underlying dynamics linking CSR to soft and 
hard law.  
 
The Nordic Model of Business-Society Relations 
 
Nordic companies can provide an interesting perspective on the debate concerning 
CSR and governance, as the Nordic area50 is reputed to be a leader both in CSR 
and in social and environmental regulation.51 Relative to the size of their 
economies, Nordic companies are overrepresented on key performance-based 
CSR indicators,52 and the Nordic governments are known to be advocates of 
sustainable development, human rights, and environmental protection in both 
national and international politics.53 The Nordic inclination for social justice and 
environmental protection is often explained with reference to the “Nordic 
Model,”54 a model that has attracted popular and scholarly interest, first as an 
alternative political-economic model positioned between liberalism and 
communism, and later for the model’s ability to deliver strong economic results in 
combination with high social welfare and cohesion.55 While the Nordic countries 
are internationally known for strong, social-democratic policies and corporatist 

48 Abbott and Snidal 2009; Fuchs 2007. 
49 Gunningham and Kagan 2005; Vogel 2009. 
50 The Nordic countries comprise Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway, as well as Iceland and 
the Faroe Islands. “Scandinavia” is often used to denote the same countries, but does strictly refer 
to the Scandinavian peninsula (Norway, Sweden and parts of Finland) or to denote the countries 
using Scandinavian languages (Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandic and Faroese). 
51 Birkin, Polesie and Lewis 2009; McCallin and Webb 2004. 
52 Gjølberg 2009; Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg 2006; Nordic Council 2005. 
53 Kuisma 2007; Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000. 
54 Also known as the Nordic Third Way, or Middle Way. 
55 Andersen et al., 2007; Byrkjeflot, Myklebust et al, 2001.
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agreements,56 Cox argues that the defining feature of the Nordic Model is not its 
specific policies, but rather the underlying norms, values and ideas of 
universalism, solidarity, and decommodification.57 Kuisma58  argues that these 
norms are anchored in the Nordic normative legacy, which predates the social-
democratic era and extends beyond politics and into all fields of society, including 
Nordic business culture. During the 1980–1990 period there was a marked interest 
in the Nordic “value-based” management style, and the management literature 
concludes that there is a specific Nordic cluster in terms of egalitarian, 
collectivist, and participatory management values and practices.59  
Thus, Nordic companies, characterized by a value-based management style 
and embedded in societies with strong traditions and institutions for social and 
environmental protection, can provide a fresh perspective concerning social and 
environmental governance, as the companies’ political strategies and perceptions 
of the role of CSR, soft law and hard law may differ from business approaches 
elsewhere.  
 
Methods 
 
The survey was designed to capture practices and perceptions of Nordic “pioneers 
in CSR” – pioneers in the sense that the companies have been rated and ranked, 
by an external organization, as having a high performance in CSR related areas. 
Seven criteria were used for identifying pioneering companies: The Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index60 and FTSE4Good,61 as well as the OMX GES Sustainability 
Nordic Index;62 that is, all the Nordic companies with the best sustainability 
ratings on the international and the Nordic stock exchanges. The selection also 
includes all Nordic companies in the 2009 ranking of the “100 Most Sustainable 
Corporations”63 announced annually at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
based on similar screening methodology as the above indices. To broaden the 
criteria beyond stock-listed companies, the selection includes all Nordic 
companies reporting a score of B or higher according to the Global Reporting 
Initiative64 guidelines, Nordic companies with CSR reports ranked among the Top 
50 CSR reports identified by the think tank SustainAbility,65 and Nordic member 

56 Esping-Andersen 1990. 
57 Cox 2004.
58 Kuisma 2007. 
59 Grenness 2003.
60 Available from: <www.sustainability-index.com/>.  
61 Available from: <http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series>. 
62 Available from: <http://www.ges-invest.com>. 
63Available from: < http://www.global100.org/list.htm>. 
64Available from: < http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportServices/GRIReportsList>. 
65 Available from: <http://www.sustainability.com/library/tomorrow-s-value>. 
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companies of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development,66 a CSR 
organization that grants membership by invitation only, and requires a substantial 
dedication from senior management.  
These seven initiatives and rankings are imperfect measures of actual CSR 
performance. They are not based on in-depth analyses of the companies’ 
practices, focus mainly on management processes rather than actual outcomes, 
and rely to a certain extent on corporate self-reporting.  
Nevertheless, qualifying for the selected initiatives does require companies 
to document best-in-class CSR practices and being approved by an external 
organization. The seven initiatives are therefore considered appropriate to identify 
companies with high CSR performance.  Still, it is important to keep in mind that 
in this article, terms such as 'CSR success' and 'CSR pioneers’ refer to companies 
that have excelled in these seven rankings, and do not imply guarantees of a 
complete representation of the companies’ practices. 
Because most of these selection criteria apply only to publicly listed 
companies, there are few private, government, or cooperatively owned companies 
among the 79 companies that met the selection criteria. Furthermore, the criteria 
favor large, multinational companies. Consequently, as the survey mainly reflects 
the practices and perceptions of dominant, well-established, multinational, 
flagship companies of the Nordic countries. There is also a bias towards Swedish 
companies: 42 companies were from Sweden, 15 from Finland, 13 from Norway 
and 9 from Denmark. Finally, the questionnaire was addressed to the manager in 
charge of CSR and a certain bias towards self-praise and political correctness in 
some of the answers is expected: CSR managers are conditioned to present their 
companies in a favorable light and the most common location for CSR 
management in the surveyed companies is the PR/Communications department. 
Therefore, to get as truthful and relevant answers as possible, the survey’s cover 
letter emphasized that responses were anonymous, and that the survey asked for 
the company’s position, not the respondents’ personal convictions. To reduce 
politically correct answers, care was taken not to pose charged or leading 
questions, and a pilot version was tested on a select group of companies and 
NGOs to find the most appropriate and precise way of formulating questions.  
The survey mainly used Likert scales where respondents were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement or disagreement with statements related to CSR, soft law, 
and hard law. Most questions applied a five-point scale, with the middle option as 
a neutral “No opinion” to allow respondents to express indifference, as well as a 
separate category for “Not applicable” and “Don’t know.”67 The respondents were 

66 Available from: <http://www.wbcsd.org/web/about/members.html>.
67 “Not applicable” and “Don’t know” were defined as missing values. “No opinion” answers were 
included in the calculations but not presented in the charts. 
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also asked to expand in writing on selected questions of key importance to 
understanding their attitudes and approaches to CSR.  
The survey was designed as an online survey. Since online surveys 
generally lead to low response rates,68 care was taken to obtain the contact 
information of the specific manager in charge of CSR.  Non-respondents were 
followed up by an e-mail reminder and subsequently a phone call. The average 
response rate was 77.2 percent, with Norway as the highest responder (92 percent) 
followed by Denmark (78 percent), Sweden (74 percent) and Finland (73 
percent). 
 
Findings 
 
Management and implementation of CSR in the Nordic Pioneers 

CSR appears closely linked with reputation, risk, and competitiveness in the 
Nordic pioneers. When asked to rank the three most important factors for the 
business case for CSR, respondents cited, in descending order, “reputation and 
brand equity,” “competitiveness and market position,” and “risk management;” 
see Table 1. The Nordic findings parallel a similar global study of CEOs,69 which 
also had reputation and brand equity as the most frequently cited factor, with 
employee relations second, and competitiveness and market position and license 
to operate tied for third. Efficiency gains, learning, and innovation are often cited 
in the literature as important factors for the business case for CSR, but these 
factors received the lowest scores in both the global group and the Nordic group. 
Correspondingly, the most common location of CSR competency is the 
Communication and PR department (44 percent), while 32 percent have located 
CSR competency within the department for Environment/ Health and Safety, and 
27 percent of the companies have a separate department dedicated to CSR. HR, 
business strategy or legal departments are less frequent places to locate CSR 
competency. 
 

68 Sheehan 2001; Shih and Fan 2008.
69 World Economic Forum 2003.
11
Gjølberg: Explaining Regulatory Preferences
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Table 1: The Business Case for CSR 
 
 
However, while CSR activities seem to be driven by reputational concerns, 
the respondents are eager to point out that they were working with these questions 
before CSR became mainstream. This claim is backed by the fact that almost 50 
percent of the companies report to have put CSR on the agenda in the 1990s (38 
percent) or earlier (10 percent), indicating that these companies were early movers 
in CSR. Furthermore, 73 percent of the companies claim the introduction of CSR 
stems from a long tradition, indicating that their CSR engagement is linked to 
practices and traditions that predate the modern CSR movement.  
In terms of CSR implementation and management, the answers reflect an 
approach to CSR closely aligned to the EU definition of CSR.70 The companies 
emphasize the integration of CSR into core business operations, and reject the 
philanthropic approach to CSR that is more prevalent in the United States. For 
instance, CSR is reported to influence the development of new products and 
services (75.4 percent), to be integrated into core business strategy (72.1 percent) 
and to influence supply chain management (70.5 percent). In contrast, 60 percent 
of the respondents disagree that sponsoring and charity are a central part of CSR, 
whereof half indicate strong disagreement.   
To conclude, the Nordic pioneers conform to mainstream contemporary 
CSR practices: CSR engagement is motivated by risk, reputation and 
competitiveness, with an emphasis on integrating CSR into core business 
operations. The relatively early starting point of CSR engagement supports the 
companies’ claims that CSR issues have long traditions. Generally, however, the 
findings do not depart from what one would expect in any other European 
company in the forefront of CSR.  

70 European Union 2001. 
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Regulatory Preferences: CSR, Soft Law, and Hard Law 

When asked to respond to statements about the role of governments and about 
preferences for CSR, soft law and hard law, the Nordic companies reveal very 
strong and uniform opinions, the number of agreement responses exceeding 80 
percent. As outlined in Section 2.2, theory predicts companies to favor CSR and 
soft law, and to resist increased social and environmental regulation, as regulation 
is said to impose costs and reduce competitiveness. As discussed in section 2.3, 
this regulatory resistance was expected to be somewhat modified by the Nordic 
culture and institutional environment, making the companies more positively 
inclined towards hard law and government engagement in the economy. 
Nevertheless, the findings far exceed the expectations, and indicate that the 
Nordic setting does more than modify regulatory skepticism. Quite the contrary, 
the Nordic pioneers in CSR express skepticism towards CSR, combined with a 
clear preference for hard law, and for government-led ratcheting up of 
international social and environmental standards.    
As shown in Table 2, 78.3 percent of the companies think their 
government should strive for binding rules and laws, and 63.3 percent want their 
government to raise social and environmental standards to increase pressure on 
laggards. Contrary to conventional liberal, laissez-faire economic theory, the 
majority of respondents (56.7 percent) disagree with the statement that “the less 
the government intervenes the better it is.” These pro-regulation attitudes are 
mirrored in the respondents’ answers regarding which initiatives they recommend 
that their government undertake to promote CSR in the national business 
community. While the respondents recommend mainstream CSR initiatives such 
as providing forums for dialogue, conducting training, and providing information 
and tax incentives, they also strongly support regulatory approaches: 71.2 percent 
recommend that their governments increase efforts to achieve global minimum 
standards related to CSR, and the majority does not find fewer inspections or less 
regulation to be important.  
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Table 2: The Role of Governments 
 
However, the most unexpected finding was respondents’ widespread 
skepticism towards the effectiveness of CSR and voluntary initiatives. 
Surprisingly, 81 percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement “CSR 
can be seen as a replacement for public policy, and public legislation should 
therefore be less restrictive.” In fact, the respondents seem to place more trust in 
government-led processes to ensure social and environmental standards: 70 
percent see voluntary initiatives and market mechanisms as insufficient to 
improve the social and environmental performance of the majority of companies, 
and 42.4 percent of the companies disagree with the statement “Business 
initiatives are more able to improve social and environmental standards than 
government policies are,” as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Regulatory Preferences 
 
 
Thus, the companies seem to doubt the ability of CSR and voluntary 
initiatives to achieve significant improvements in social and environmental 
practices. This skepticism towards CSR is a paradox, since the companies in the 
survey all have invested resources in developing and documenting their CSR 
performance. This finding creates a somewhat disturbing picture of the nature of 
their CSR engagement when considered in light of their answers in the previous 
section: the most frequent location of CSR competency in the company is in the 
PR/Communications department, and the companies’ prime motivation to engage 
in CSR is reputation and brand. Thus, the companies seem to participate in CSR 
initiatives primarily out of PR-related motivations and to have little faith in CSR 
as an instrument to improve their practices. Their CSR engagement seems to be 
driven by a logic of symbolic politics. Moreover, the causal order between CSR 
engagement and social and environmental performance appear somewhat 
counterintuitive as CSR engagement appears to come post factum: engagement in 
CSR initiatives does not seem to be the cause of the Nordic pioneers’ high social 
and environmental performance. Instead, already having high social and 
environmental performance seems to lead to their CSR engagement; to some 
extent, the companies seem to join CSR initiatives, not to improve their 
performance, but to improve their communication of performance.  
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Analysis: Explaining Regulatory Preferences 
 
To understand the companies’ skepticism towards CSR and their preference for 
hard law, one must understand to what they attribute their high performance in 
CSR. The empirical material points to two separate but interrelated explanations. 
The companies attribute their high CSR performance to cultural and institutional 
aspects of the Nordic Model; those aspects provide them with a competitive 
advantage in social and environmental performance – an advantage which in turn 
explains the companies’ preference for hard law, as will be discussed in the 
following sections.  
 
Values and Institutions: The Nordic Factor 
 
In explaining patterns of success in CSR, the literature points to the importance of 
systemic factors, rather than to company- or industry-specific factors:71 studies 
show that Nordic companies in general are overrepresented in key global, 
performance-based CSR initiatives,72 and the literature on comparative CSR 
demonstrates that nationality matters for how companies approach and perform 
CSR.73 Thus, deeply embedded cultural values and traditions, as well as key 
institutions of the Nordic political-economic systems, might provide answers to 
the companies’ high social and environmental performance, which has qualified 
them for the CSR initiatives and rankings that form the basis of this survey. 
The empirical findings in the survey underscore the relevance of systemic 
factors. Although this survey comprises companies of different sizes, industries 
and ownership structures, the agreement rates were close to 80 percent in many 
answers about CSR in a Nordic perspective. Despite the fact that the majority of 
the companies in the survey are multinational, with significant markets and 
production in Central/Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America, 75.4 percent 
agree with the statement “the Nordic background of my company affects the way 
we work with CSR,” as shown in Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

71 For a review of how firm-specific factors influence regulatory preferences, see Johnstone et al 
2004. 
72 Midttun et al 2006. 
73 Gjølberg 2009; Matten and Moon 2008; Williams and Aguilera 2008.
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Table 4: The Significance of a Nordic Background 
 
The respondents clearly see their Nordic background as relevant to their 
high CSR performance: 68.3 percent state that “a Nordic background is an 
advantage to succeed in CSR,” and the majority agree that the average Nordic 
company has comparatively higher environmental and social standards, as shown 
in Table 4.  
Moreover, the companies themselves point to Nordic cultural and 
institutional factors when asked to elaborate on why a Nordic background is an 
advantage to succeed in CSR. The respondents claim that the Nordic culture, 
traditions, values, and “the Nordic business model” provide them with experience, 
competence and knowledge in integrating social and environmental concerns into 
their business operations. Their answers are strikingly uniform when describing 
Nordic characteristics in relation to CSR, and the answers correspond closely to 
expectations from literature on the Nordic Model, which predicts high scores on 
participatory values, respect for nature, and a strong emphasis on equality.74 As 
Table 5 shows, respect for nature, traditions for democracy and participation, and 
values of equality and justice, are identified as the most important characteristics. 
In their written answers the companies also emphasize that environmental 
awareness, transparency, equality and a consensus-seeking mindset, facilitate 
stakeholder dialogue and integration of CSR issues into business operations.  
 

74 Dahl 1984; Kuisma 2007. 
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Table 5: Characteristics Rated as Typical of a Nordic Approach to CSR 
 
 
This Nordic background seems not only to affect employees, management 
and the board, but also to create higher expectations of ethical business practices 
in their home markets, as respondents claim that “there is a demand in the 
[Nordic] market that is not present in many other markets.” This claim is 
confirmed by findings in the Eurobarometer of “Attitudes of European Citizens 
towards the Environment,” which reports Nordic scores much higher than the EU 
average scores. For instance, 99 percent of Nordic respondents answer that the 
environment is fairly or very important to them, and they show above-average 
scores on actions undertaken to protect the environment, and on willingness to 
buy environmentally friendly products.75  
However, the respondents often mention these value-based explanations in 
tandem with institutions and practices typical of the Nordic political-economic 
systems. As Table 5 shows, cooperation with trade unions, often not considered 
integral to CSR elsewhere,76 was identified as characteristic of a Nordic approach 

75 Tunkrova 2008.
76 Preuss et al 2006; Utting 2000. 
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to CSR, with 77 percent of respondents answering this question positively. 
Several respondents explain in their written comments that tripartite negotiations 
and dialogue with employees—induced by the  corporatist system—have fostered 
skills that are highly relevant to their CSR activities, for instance stakeholder 
dialogue and integration of social concerns into business operations. Cooperation 
with NGOs, on the other hand, received a substantially lower score (42.2 percent) 
and is clearly not seen as typically Nordic, although in practice, cooperation with 
NGOs is slightly more prevalent than cooperation with labor unions (49.2 percent 
versus 44.3 percent). 
However, strict, longstanding domestic regulation is cited as the main 
reason why respondents answered that a Nordic background is an advantage to 
succeed in CSR, as illustrated by these written comments: 
 
Nordic countries have long traditions for CSR-related 
legislation, which has made the companies here work with 
these issues for decades.  
As a Nordic company, we also have long traditions in 
living with environmental and social/labor laws that have 
become a natural part of our thinking. 
Social and environmental legislation makes us do most 
of the basic issues automatically. 
 
Thus, respondents attributed their success in CSR to the competence, 
experience and knowledge that result from corporatist dialogue and the high 
regulatory standards of the Nordic countries, further strengthened by deeply 
rooted Nordic values, and by the strong expectations of their domestic audience. 
The companies seem to find that the Nordic cultural, institutional, and regulatory 
background produces an advantage in CSR. This notion of a specific Nordic 
advantage in relation to CSR has clear parallels to Hall and Soskice’77 concept of 
comparative institutional advantage. The authors claim that nationally based 
social, political and economic institutions can provide a comparative advantage in 
specific kinds of corporate activities. Whereas Hall and Soskice developed their 
argument around comparative institutional advantages in innovation, but the 
survey findings indicate that there might be a comparative institutional advantage 
for CSR as well, as the Nordic companies find that their Nordic institutional 
background makes it comparatively easier for them to achieve high CSR 
performance. It is this competitive position in social and environmental 
performance which seems to cause their preference for hard law, as opposed to 
CSR and soft law. This will be discussed in the next section.  

77 Soskice 2001.
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 Competitive Advantage: Beneficiaries of a Level Playing Field 
 
The rationale behind the companies’ preference for hard law is quite evident in 
respondents’ answers to questions related to competitiveness. When asked how 
their companies’ competitiveness would be affected by stricter, effective, global 
social and environmental regulations, 83.1 percent of the companies responded 
that such regulation would strengthen their competitiveness, responding with a 6 
or higher on a scale of 10. (See Table 6) Only 5.1 percent responded that stricter 
regulation would weaken their competitiveness, responding with 5 or lower. 
 
Table 6: Regulations and their Effects on Competitiveness 
 
 
As pioneers in CSR, it is both logical and strategic for these companies to 
lobby for binding regulation of CSR-related issues: they most likely already 
comply with conceivable future regulatory requirements, and thus have a 
competitive advantage. As expressed by one of the respondents: 
 
The point is really GLOBAL AND BINDING 
[regulations] as this would help eco-efficient, socially 
responsible companies to win. (respondent’s capitalization). 
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Simply put, lobbying for stricter global regulations would sharpen their 
competitive advantage and in a sense constitute a return on social and 
environmental investments already undertaken. Stricter global regulations would 
impose on their competitors costs that the Nordic pioneers have already absorbed, 
but from which their international competitors so far have been exempt. Similar 
strategies are documented in corporate lobbying for the Montreal Protocol by 
companies already in compliance with anticipated regulations.78 Another 
illustrating example is that of the writing of the ISO 14001 standard: through 
effective lobbying, European businesses managed to influence the standard so that 
it resembled the European EMAS scheme, thereby effectively forcing U.S. and 
Asian competitors to adhere to the same standards that European businesses 
already had to adhere to under EU regulations.79 These processes of a “race to the 
top”,80 where powerful green jurisdictions impose their higher standards on their 
competitors, illustrate how domestic regulations can serve as a source of 
strengthened national and international regulations.81 In the survey, this dynamic 
seems mainly to apply to international regulations, but respondents also want 
government to level their national playing fields, as they are positive towards 
increased regulation that would put pressure on laggards. Presumably, though, 
respondents would not support, for instance, higher domestic wage regulations, as 
this would reduce their international competitiveness.  
Thus, companies that assume they already comply with future regulation 
seem to support stricter regulation, as such regulation would strengthen their 
competitive advantage. Companies already subject to stricter, domestic, 
mandatory social and environmental regulations or corporatist agreements will 
have an incentive to welcome increased global regulation. Correspondingly, 
companies that voluntarily—because of values and tradition, market expectations, 
operational demands, stakeholder pressure, or competitive strategy—chose to 
raise their social and environmental standards will have an incentive to support 
tougher regulations, domestic and global, as tougher regulations would subject 
competitors to costs that these companies voluntarily accepted.  
 
 

78 Vormedal 2008. 
79 Braithwaite Drahos 2000.
80 Also referred to as the “California effect.” 
81 DeSombre 1995 and 2000; Vogel 1995.
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Figure 1: Causes of Regulatory Preference for Hard Law 
 
 
The Nordic companies seem to be in a position where mandatory and 
voluntary drivers mutually reinforce each other and spur companies towards best-
in-class CSR performance, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Nordic Norms Versus Comparative Institutional Advantages 
 
Birkin et al82 conclude in their study that social norms are the decisive factor for 
Nordic success in CSR—a love for nature, social equality and consensus. The 
present survey supports this finding; respondents rate the same norms and values 
as characteristic of Nordic CSR (Table 5), and explain their CSR success with 
reference to Nordic norms and institutions. From this perspective, the relevance of 
the survey findings seems limited to the Nordic context.  
However, while Nordic norms and institutions seem decisive to the 
companies’ excellence in CSR, there is nothing specifically “Nordic” about the 
companies’ support for stricter social and environmental regulation. In fact, none 
of the respondents gives norm-based explanations for their regulatory support. 
Instead, they list market positioning, competitive advantage and a level playing 
field as their reasons for wanting stricter regulations. Combined with the findings 
in Tables 4, 5 and 6, there are strong indications that the companies’ pro-
regulation position is the logical and strategic extension of their perceived 
competitive advantage in social and environmental performance, an advantage 
that is not inherently restricted to Nordic companies. The specific Nordic values 
and political-economic institutions seem to function mainly as intermediate 
factors, as factors fostering skills that give the companies a competitive advantage 
in social and environmental issues. This competitive advantage appears to be the 
key causal factor for regulatory support: The companies consider their 
performance best-in-class, or at least above anticipated regulatory requirements. 
Regulations therefore make good business sense, as they will level the playing 
field to their benefit. To conclude, regulatory support seems to result from a 

82 Birkin et al 2009. 
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generic, instrumental “logic of consequence” rather than a specifically Nordic 
“logic of appropriateness,” to use March and Olsen’s terms.83   
Nevertheless, Nordic norms and institutions might affect the companies’ 
perception and analysis of regulatory risks and opportunities. A general trust in 
regulations and skepticism towards voluntary approaches seem to be deeply 
rooted traditions among Nordic managers. In a 1996 survey84 of Nordic publicly 
listed companies, 75 percent of managers did not believe that voluntary, market-
based mechanisms were sufficient, and saw legislation as necessary to protect the 
environment. A comparative study85 of Nordic and U.S. managers showed Nordic 
managers were significantly more positive towards the competitive effects of 
environmental legislation than were their U.S. counterparts, even though 
managers from both countries considered their companies to be ahead of 
competitors. Thus, companies react differently to similar regulatory proposals. A 
competitive advantage seems a necessary, but still not a sufficient condition for 
regulatory support. Cross-national comparisons are needed to establish the precise 
causal combinations that lead companies to favor hard law over CSR or soft law. 
 
Implications and Conclusion 
 
The empirical analysis provides insights into the relationship between CSR, soft 
law and hard law, and documents that business can support stricter social and 
environmental regulations under certain conditions. In this respect, it is important 
to note that the survey includes hardly any niche companies that would benefit 
directly from stricter, mandatory standards, such as clean-tech companies or 
social enterprises; companies surveyed were almost exclusively large, dominant, 
mainstream companies of the Nordic economies.  
The findings counter assumptions about corporate resistance to social and 
environmental regulations, as discussed in section 2.2. Unexpectedly, Nordic CSR 
pioneers are skeptical towards CSR and voluntary approaches in global 
governance, and strongly prefer hard law. These findings also challenge critics’ 
claim that CSR is a corporate strategy to pre-empt legislation, as outlined in 
section 2.1. Furthermore, the empirical material provides an important addition to 
the literature outlined in section 2.2 explaining why some companies adopt a pro-
regulation position in cases involving direct regulatory threat. In contrast, the 
Nordic position seems motivated by regulatory opportunities—regulatory threat 
does not seem to be a necessary condition.   
Thus, the empirical analysis contributes to the emerging literature showing 
how globally competing companies have incentives to work towards industry-

83 March and Olsen 2004. 
84 Ytterhus and Synnestvedt 1996. 
85 Lindell and Karagozoglu 2001.
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wide, international regulations if they are subject to stricter domestic regulation, 
corporatist pressure, or for commercial reasons must self-impose higher 
standards.86 Depending on political and regulatory momentum, the playing field’s 
unevenness, and available exit strategies, a “tipping point” in corporate political 
strategy can occur. At this point, a critical mass of companies shift from 
resistance to support of international regulation out of self-interest, which is 
expected to positively affect the negotiations of international social and 
environmental regimes.87 In these situations, CSR initiatives may serve as 
blueprints in developing soft or hard law, as discussed in section 2.1. Such 
juridification of CSR initiatives demonstrates that CSR can serve as a potential 
source for soft or hard law, and the Nordic companies’ pro-regulation position 
may indeed indicate a potential source for future juridification of CSR initiatives.  
However, can CSR in and of itself contribute to tipping points towards 
regulatory support? If the Nordic pro-regulation attitude results from a pre-
existing competitive advantage in social and envrionmental performance, CSR 
appears to be superfluous: CSR initiatives merely rubber-stamp actions that 
mainly result from regulation, institutions and values which all predate or occur 
independently of any CSR initiative. Thus, CSR does not seem effective in terms 
of causing responsible behavior. Instead, CSR seems to be effective in terms of 
communicating responsible behavior. As discussed in section 4.1, the companies 
list PR and reputation as the main motivations for their CSR efforts, and they 
respond with profound skepticism regarding the effectiveness of CSR in actually 
improving mainstream business practices. This finding parallels findings of other 
studies showing that companies see CSR as an effective instrument to enhance 
legitimacy, but not to enhance management of social and environmental 
practices.88 Regarding causal order therefore, CSR engagement appears to be the 
effect, not the cause, of the companies’ high standards. In conclusion, CSR 
appears slightly irrelevant, both in explaining the Nordic pioneers’ strong social 
and environmental performance, as well as in explaining their strong pro-
regulation position. 
However, CSR initiatives can have an independent effect if they provide 
institutional platforms where alliances between NGOs, governments, and pro-
regulation companies can form. Environmental and social risks, liabilities, and 
opportunities are becoming increasingly intertwined with economic 
competitiveness, altering how companies calculate their interests, and making 
more companies likely to engage in CSR initiatives as a first step towards 
addressing these new challenges.89 Therefore, one needs to account for the 

86 Bendell and Kearins 2005; Mattli and Woods 2009. 
87 Vormedal 2010. 
88 Boasson 2009. 
89 Dashwood 2004, Falkner 2008, Hoffman 2000, Kirton and Trebilock 2004, Reinhart 2000. 
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importance of ideas when analyzing how CSR can contribute to soft and hard law. 
Several authors argue that the institutionalized engagement between business and 
civil society in CSR initiatives may create a dynamic that transcends CSR by 
inducing normative, cognitive and discursive processes that change perceptions of 
business’s role in society.90  
Furthermore, CSR initiatives can, in sum, create an uneven playing field 
by establishing a plethora of overlapping and partially conflicting private 
regulations and standards. This unintended side effect of CSR can stimulate 
corporate support for mandatory regulations that would create a more harmonized 
set of standards for companies. In combination, these regulatory, normative, 
technological and competitive risks and opportunities can, as illustrated by the 
Nordic material, shift corporate positions towards support for regulation, as a 
strategy to secure future competitiveness. Thus, CSR may contribute towards 
tipping point processes—as a driver for normative, regulatory and technological 
changes that cause dominant corporations to redefine their interests and change 
their strategies from resistance to support for soft and hard law processes. 
To conclude, the analysis shows that companies’ preferences for 
regulation via CSR, soft law or hard law cannot be taken for granted, but must be 
understood within a wider context of normative, institutional and regulatory 
environments, even for companies with strong multinational profiles. 
Furthermore, the findings document that strong CSR performance is compatible 
with a regulatory preference for hard law. Nevertheless, CSR appears unlikely in 
itself to generate tipping points of corporate support for social and environmental 
regulation. As illustrated by the Nordic material, CSR engagement appears merely 
to correlate with rather than actually to cause the pro-regulation attitude of Nordic 
CSR pioneers. However, insofar as CSR initiatives manage to link debates, actors, 
and processes that contribute towards support for soft and hard law processes, 
they can overcome some of the inherent limitations that arise from CSR’s market-
based, voluntary nature.  
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